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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This dissertation addresses the broad topic of appropriate metrics, proxies, and 
estimation methods in environmental economics and international trade research, 
presented as three separate studies.  The first, entitled, “Something in the Water?  Testing 
for Groundwater Quality Information in the Housing Market,” examines how informed 
real estate markets are with respect to groundwater quality by using a couple of different 
proxies for groundwater quality in a hedonic framework.  This research topic has 
potentially suffered from imperfect proxies and incomplete information, which I test.  In 
the second, entitled, “Do Economic Integration Agreements Actually Work? Issues in 
Understanding the Causes and Consequences of the Growth in Regionalism,” I address a 
topic in international trade that has consistently suffered from endogeneity biases in 
estimations: the effect of economic integration agreements on bilateral trade flows.   The 
third study, called “Trade Flow Consequences of the European Union’s Regionalization 
of Environmental Regulations,” synthesizes the fields of environmental economics and 
international trade.  I introduce a new proxy – survey data – that does not rely on 
environmental outcomes and thus hopefully avoids endogeneity.  Controlling for any 
possible interaction effect between environmental regulation stringency and European 
Union membership, I estimate the effect of increasing environmental regulation 
stringency on trade flows to and from three groups of countries: high income countries, 
low income countries, and all countries. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This dissertation addresses the broad topic of appropriate metrics, proxies, and 
estimation methods in environmental economics and international trade research.  
Chapters two, three, and four present research into three seemingly diverse subjects.  The 
first of the three research subjects is estimating the effect of groundwater contamination 
on real estate prices.  The second subject is the estimation of the effect of bilateral 
economic integration agreements on trade flows.  The third subject, at the intersection of 
environmental economics and international trade, is estimation of the effect of 
environmental regulations on trade flows inside and outside economic integration 
agreements. 
Proxies and estimation issues in environmental economics 
Chapter two, entitled, “Something in the Water?  Testing for Groundwater 
Quality Information in the Housing Market,” examines how informed real estate markets 
are with respect to groundwater quality by using a couple of different proxies for 
groundwater quality in a hedonic framework.  Houses are usually sold bundled with 
property rights to groundwater access, and contamination of a house’s groundwater 
source diminishes the value of that house.  Researchers have often tried to assess the 
economic damages caused by environmental disamenities such as groundwater 
contamination, air quality degradation, and elevated ambient noise levels by inserting 
some variable measuring the disamenity in a hedonic model.  The metrics of these 
disamenities, however, generally have been proxies, such as a house’s distance from a 
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contamination source, rather than some measurement that takes into account the likely 
migration path of contaminants.  In the case of groundwater, contaminants typically do 
not migrate in all directions away from the source at the same speed; rather, the 
distribution of contaminants at each event depends on the hydrologic and geologic 
realities of the vicinity.  If market participants are fully informed of the levels of 
contamination in the groundwater below each house, then using distance from 
contamination as a proxy likely biases downward estimates of economic damages from 
the contamination.  Conversely, it is possible that market participants are not fully 
informed of where the contamination is; in such a case, distance from a contamination 
source or some other proxy might represent market participants’ best guess as to where 
the contamination is, and, as a result, would serve well as a determinant of house value in 
a hedonic estimation.   
 I use data on which houses were chosen by governmental regulators to have their 
groundwater quality tested in an area with potentially contaminated groundwater near St. 
Paul, Minnesota; with these data, I create a new proxy for groundwater contamination 
that differs from distance as a proxy because it takes into account the groundwater 
migration path of the contaminants.  Controlling for other features that likely contribute 
or detract from house value, I test whether this proxy – a binary variable indicating 
whether a house had its groundwater tested – is a significant determinant of house value.  
The estimate of the effect of this proxy on house value turns out to be negative and 
significant prior to the passage of legislation that requires sellers in the area to inform 
potential buyers of the potential contamination of groundwater in the vicinity.  After the 
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new legislation, however, the estimate of the effect of being tested becomes statistically 
insignificant; instead, the estimate on the value of house location in the geographic area 
created by the new legislation decreases relative to pre-legislation levels.  Thus, prior to 
the existence of the legislation, the market appeared to be relatively well-informed about 
the location of the contamination; after the passage of the legislation, information levels 
changed, and all houses, regardless of the contaminant’s migration path, in the vicinity 
were treated by the market as if they had contaminated water.  I interpret this as a result 
of a change in the cost of information-gathering: the legislation provided a cheap, if 
imperfect, information source to market participants. 
Proxies and estimation issues in international trade 
  In the second chapter, entitled, “Do Economic Integration Agreements Actually 
Work? Issues in Understanding the Causes and Consequences of the Growth in 
Regionalism,” I address a topic in international trade that has consistently suffered from 
endogeneity biases in estimations: the effect of economic integration agreements on 
bilateral trade flows.  I show that traditional gravity equations estimations of the effects 
of the European Union and other major European free trade agreements have been 
implausibly low.  Because countries select into free trade agreements, it is not an 
exogenous treatment.  Using bilateral fixed effects and first-differencing, I overcome the 
endogeneity bias and deliver consistent and plausible estimates of the effects of joining 
these trade agreements on bilateral trade flows, estimates that are much higher than those 
of “traditional” gravity estimates. 
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Environmental economics and international trade 
 The third chapter, called “Trade Flow Consequences of the European Union’s 
Regionalization of Environmental Regulations,” synthesizes the fields of environmental 
economics and international trade.  Environmental regulations could both theoretically 
and empirically affect trade flow patterns between countries.  Still, our understanding of 
their effect has been hindered for three main reasons.  First, researchers investigating this 
effect have ignored the possibility of an interaction effect between economic integration 
agreements and environmental regulations.  Second, many studies on this topic have 
suffered from endogeneity both in their measures of environmental regulation stringency 
and in their inclusion of economic integration agreement variables without bilateral fixed 
effects.  Third, despite the fact that regional groups of countries do sometimes impose 
environmental regulations on themselves, researchers have not analyzed whether certain 
segments of the regional group – for example, high income countries – stand to gain from 
such impositions. 
 I introduce a new proxy – survey data – that does not rely on environmental 
outcomes and thus hopefully avoids endogeneity.  Controlling for any possible 
interaction effect between environmental regulation stringency and European Union 
membership, I estimate the effect of increasing environmental regulation stringency on 
trade flows to and from three groups of countries: high income countries, low income 
countries, and all countries.  I find that an increase in environmental regulation stringency 
in low income countries leads to a decrease in exports if that country is a European Union 
member; otherwise, there is no significant effect.  Conversely, a similar change in high 
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income countries actually increases exports, and this increase is larger if the country is a 
European Union member.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
SOMETHING IN THE WATER? TESTING FOR GROUNDWATER QUALITY 
INFORMATION IN THE HOUSING MARKET 
 
Introduction 
 
In 1988, an extensive plume of trichloroethylene (TCE), which the US 
Environmental Protection Agency lists as a potential carcinogen, was discovered in the 
groundwater in the area of Baytown Township, in Washington County, Minnesota.  
Many houses and businesses in the area of the plume rely on groundwater as the primary 
source for water consumption, so the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) and 
the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) subsequently took actions to limit human 
exposure to TCE and to prevent further spread of the contaminant plume.  The 
contaminant plume is an environmental disamenity that might negatively affect real 
estate prices in the area.  Well-water measurements of TCE levels by the MPCA, as well 
as other actions taken by MPCA and MDH, contain information that might affect real 
estate values in different ways, and these effects might not be limited to only those 
houses situated on the plume.  If the real estate market is completely informed about the 
whereabouts of the plume, then any negative effect on real estate prices should occur 
only where houses have contaminated water or are likely to have contaminated water in 
the future.  Conversely, if the market is incompletely informed about the whereabouts of 
the plume, then houses whose groundwater will likely never be affected by Baytown 
Township TCE plume could experience a loss in property value. 
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 In this paper, I test for the presence of complete information, incomplete 
information, or no information regarding the quality of groundwater in the residential real 
estate market near the Baytown Township Groundwater Contamination Superfund Site 
(Baytown Site or the Site).  I also test the effects of some state regulations regarding the 
Site on information levels and, correspondingly, prices in the real estate market.  The 
hypotheses that I test are: 
 Hypothesis 1:  There is no information regarding groundwater quality priced into 
the market (this is observationally equivalent to the hypothesis that market participants 
simply do not value groundwater quality).   
 Hypothesis 2:  There is incomplete information regarding groundwater quality 
priced into the market.  This hypothesis might hold if market participants rely on 
imperfect proxies such as distance from the contaminant source or state and local 
regulations for information about present and future groundwater quality.   
 Hypothesis 3: There is complete information regarding groundwater quality 
priced into the market.  This hypothesis might hold if participants rely on groundwater 
tests at each house for information about present groundwater quality and participants are 
able to reliably predict future groundwater quality. 
 One focus of this paper is determining whether governmental regulations 
regarding the Baytown Site induce some market reaction.  For example, one regulation 
established regarding the Baytown Site was special well construction area (SWCA) 
legislation, passed in 1988 and subsequently revised in 2002.  The SWCA legislation and 
a later disclosure statute related to it could affect the real estate market in two ways.  The 
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first is the geographic delineation of the area that would be included in the SWCA; any 
work done on wells inside this area required special permits and inspections, increasing 
the cost of new well construction.  The geographic boundaries of the SWCA do not 
match the edges of the groundwater contamination plume, and, furthermore, the 
boundaries of the SWCA changed once in accordance to changes in regulatory policies 
regarding the relative toxicity of TCE.  Market participants might rely on the delineation 
of the SWCA as a proxy for the probability that a house has contaminated groundwater, 
negatively affecting real estate value inside the SWCA.  The second way the SWCA 
might, indirectly, affect the real estate market is through a Minnesota statute passed in 
2003 requiring sellers of property in Washington County to disclose to prospective 
buyers if the property is located within the SWCA.  It is possible that market participants 
did not possess information about the SWCA prior to the disclosure law, or that market 
participants interpreted the creation of a SWCA disclosure law as a signal that all houses 
in the SWCA might possess contaminated water.  If the disclosure law either added new 
information regarding groundwater quality into the housing market or lowered the cost of 
information gathering, house prices in the SWCA might respond accordingly. 
 The results indicate that during the period from 1995 – 2002, prior to the passage 
of the disclosure law, the market was well-informed about the location of the contaminant 
plume.  Houses that are in the SWCA but not at risk of contamination do not suffer any 
loss in property value, while those that are at risk of contamination do.  In the period 
from 2003 – 2006, after the passage of the disclosure law, houses in the SWCA that are 
not at risk of contamination lose property value, relative to the previous period.  Houses 
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that are at risk of contamination suffer no more loss in property value than other homes 
(assumed to not be at risk) in the SWCA after the passage of the disclosure law.  These 
results imply that market participants used the lowest-cost information – namely, whether 
a house was located in the SWCA – available regarding groundwater quality in making 
buying and selling decisions, even though that information was an imperfect proxy for 
the real distribution of risk.  Alternatively, these results could indicate that market 
participants interpreted the disclosure law as a signal that the contaminant plume might 
expand, even though the plume has been relatively stable for many years. 
Background 
 In the residential real estate market, some information about the valued 
components of a house is readily observable and quantifiable: a prospective buyer can 
tour a house, count the number of bedrooms, and test the functionality of the bathrooms 
at a relatively low cost.  Conversely, some components of the house are not so easily 
observable.  For example, a prospective buyer would find it difficult to predict whether 
the neighborhood will offer the proper level of “peace and quiet” without spending a few 
weekends in the house listening for raucous neighbors, and prospective buyers regularly 
rely on expert house inspectors for information regarding structural integrity and whether 
termites have ever infested the house.     
 One implicitly-owned component of a house that is costly to observe is the quality 
of the groundwater beneath the property.  Groundwater quality presumably would be an 
important aspect of houses with private wells that tap into a potentially contaminated 
aquifer for water consumption.  Also, groundwater quality could be important even if the 
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house had a municipal water supply, because the possibility of exposure to groundwater-
borne contaminants through some other medium than consumption exists.  While the 
present quality of groundwater at a given house can be tested at some expense, it is much 
more difficult to predict the future quality of groundwater at that house.  One way to 
predict the future quality level of groundwater when there is a known contaminant source 
is to use a groundwater contaminant transport model (see McLaughlin and Coffey, 2007, 
for an example).  Such a model requires detailed information about the hydrological and 
geological features in an area, as well significant scientific and mathematical expertise. 
As an alternative to testing the present quality of groundwater or predicting future quality 
levels with a groundwater contaminant transport model, market participants may rely on 
proxies and signals to inform them of quality levels.  There are many possible sources of 
information about groundwater quality at a house; some, such as actual well sample tests 
and effective groundwater contaminant transport models, are more accurate sources than 
others, such as taste, smell, newspaper articles, word of mouth, or legislated zones like 
the special well construction area (SWCA).  The less accurate sources might indeed 
create a misperception of health risk from consumption of groundwater if the information 
conveyed does not reflect the actual present and probable future groundwater 
contamination status.   Conveyance of incomplete information or of incorrect information 
regarding groundwater contamination might induce market reactions where none would 
have occurred, had there been complete information. 
 In the case of a publicly-known groundwater contamination site, such as a 
Superfund site, market participants (and particularly prospective buyers) might use some 
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proxy for the probability of groundwater contamination, such as distance from the 
contaminant source, if the source is known.  Market participants might alternatively rely 
on other proxies where and when they exist, such as the aforementioned SWCA or other 
government legislation requiring prospective buyers to be informed of a house’s 
proximity to a groundwater contamination source.   Such proxies are usually imperfect; 
groundwater contaminants do not normally migrate away from their source at equal 
speeds in all directions, nor do they tend to follow county or township borders inside 
which legally created signals such as the SWCA exist.  For instance, a house might be 
situated a very short distance from a contaminant source yet have almost zero probability 
of groundwater contamination from that source because contaminants are transported 
away from the house.  In such a case, using distance from the contaminant source as a 
proxy for the probability of groundwater contamination from that source would result in 
an overestimation of that probability. 
Baytown Site History 
 This paper focuses on the level of information regarding groundwater quality that 
is present in the real estate market surrounding the Baytown Site at different points in 
time and how that information is priced into the market for houses.  Figure 1 shows the 
location of Washington County in Minnesota.  Table 1 details a chronology of Baytown 
Site events, and this section provides a brief history of the Site.   
 In 1987, a Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) sampling of wells near a 
landfill at Stillwater Prison showed the presence of trichloroethylene (TCE) and carbon 
tetrachloride (CCl4) in the groundwater.  Subsequent testing showed that CCl4 was not 
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widespread or at high levels, and the primary contaminant of concern became TCE.  
People who drink water containing TCE in excess of five micrograms per liter over many 
years could experience liver problems and may have increased cancer risk (U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 2006).  The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency 
tracked the plume to the Lake Elmo Airport, and in May 1988, the Minnesota Department 
of Health (MDH) designated an area of Washington County including the known plume 
and its vicinity as a special well construction area (SWCA).  One MDH document states, 
“The SWCA informs well owners and drillers about the potential for contaminated 
ground water [sic] in the area and serves to prevent further degradation of the aquifer by 
requiring proper construction of new wells” (MDH 2004, 10). The Baytown Site was 
added to Minnesota’s State Superfund Permanent List of Priorities, while the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the site to the Superfund National 
Priorities List in 1995. 
 In 1988, because the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) had tracked 
the plume to Lake Elmo Airport, MPCA issued a formal request for information to the 
Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC).  MAC voluntarily investigated groundwater 
beneath the airport from 1988 though 1991, and found significant quantities of TCE 
below the airport in two aquifers, the Prairie du Chien aquifer and the Jordan aquifer, 
both of which are used for drinking water.  MAC was declared a responsible party in 
1991, blamed for the TCE contamination, and together with MPCA conducted further 
investigations from 1992 to 1998.  Finally, in 2000, based on a feasibility study finished 
in 1999, MPCA decided to install point-of-use granulated activated carbon (GAC) filter 
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systems on certain private wells as the primary remedial action.  Tests performed by the 
MPCA on post-filter samples indicate that the GAC filter systems effectively reduce TCE 
to below laboratory reporting limits, “indicating that [GAC filtered-]well users were not 
exposed to the contaminants” (MPCA, 2007, 9). At this point in time, although the source 
was suspected to be physically underneath the airport, no location had been pinpointed; 
thus remedial action could not include removing or treating the source.  Houses that had 
water with TCE above 30 µg/L received GAC filters at this time; 30 µg/L was the 
Minnesota Department of Health’s human risk limit, or maximum level allowable 
without treatment, until 2002.  Six filter systems were installed under this policy prior to 
2002.  A change in the human risk limit in 2002 (addressed in detail in section 2.3) 
resulted in many more houses receiving GAC filters, at MPCA’s expense.  As of March 
2007, a total of 162 GAC filters had been installed and paid for by MPCA.  Houses that 
were built on parcels platted after April 9, 2002, and that had TCE measured above 5 
µg/L in private wells were required to install GAC filter systems, but the MPCA did not 
pay for these. 
 From 2002 to 2004, MPCA conducted additional soil and groundwater tests west 
of the airport in an attempt to locate the primary contaminant source.  As a result, the 
primary source was thought to lie below Hagberg’s Country Market, about ¾ mile west 
of the airport.  From 1940 to 1968, a metal-working facility occupied this property, and it 
is suspected that TCE was used as a degreaser at this facility and subsequently released 
into the groundwater.  A remedial plan for treatment of the source had been investigated 
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but not yet implemented as of August 2007.  It is still not certain if the primary source 
has been found, nor is it known if that is the only source. 
 The TCE plume was characterized in March 2007 as approximately five miles 
long, covering seven square miles in central Washington County.  Approximately 650 
homes and several businesses rely upon private wells that tap into the contaminated 
aquifers.  The MPCA monitors public sentry wells (monitoring wells) and many private 
wells in the area, and offers bottled water to residents whose wells exceed the human risk 
limit (HRL) until GAC filter systems can be installed.  Policies regarding where and 
when GAC filter systems are installed and who pays for them were set by MPCA and 
MDH.  Between 2000 and 2002, the policy was that any home with measured TCE above 
the HRL of 30 µg/L (micrograms per liter) had a whole house GAC filter system installed 
at MPCA’s expense1.  The HRL was changed to 5 µg/L in 2002; as a result, policy 
changed.  The new policy was that any house with TCE measured above 5 µg/L and with 
a parcel platted prior to April 9, 2002, received a GAC filter system from MPCA.  
Houses platted after that date and that had TCE above 5 µg/L were required to purchase 
their own GAC filter systems. 
Special Well Construction Area 
 Legislative and institutional controls might be a source of information for real 
estate market participants.  One institutional control established regarding the Baytown 
                                                 
1
 The plume’s source was originally thought to be the Lake Elmo Airport, and the Metropolitan Airport 
Commission (MAC) was the only potentially responsible party.  As such, MAC voluntarily conducted 
various investigations and feasibility studies from 1988 to 2001 and helped pay for GAC systems on those 
houses with high TCE levels.  Subsequently, the source was discovered to be farther west and merely 
migrating beneath the airport.  MAC is investigating options to recover the money it “voluntarily” spent. 
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site was the special well construction area (SWCA) legislation, passed in 1988 and 
subsequently revised in 2002.  There are two important facts related to the SWCA that 
could affect the real estate market.  The first is the delineation of the area that would be 
included in the SWCA.  The second is a Minnesota statute (Minn. Statute 103I.236) 
passed in 2003 that required sellers of property in Washington County to disclose to 
prospective buyers whether the property is located in the SWCA, if the property is not 
served by a municipal water system or if the property contains an unsealed well.   
 The original SWCA legislation, created in 1988, identified a geographic area 
encompassing the known plume itself as well as extra buffer area around the plume.  At 
that time, the EPA had determined that the maximum contaminant level (MCL) allowable 
in drinking water for TCE was 30 micrograms per liter (µg/L); Minnesota Department of 
Health (MDH) had adopted the same standard, setting its human risk level at 30 µg/L.  
Accordingly, the primary goal for MDH was to ensure that residents were not consuming 
water with TCE above the accepted human risk level, and created the original SWCA 
with this human risk level in mind.  Later, however, regulators expanded the SWCA both 
as additional testing discovered the full extent of TCE migration and as EPA policy 
regarding the maximum contaminant level for TCE changed.  The SWCA is a geographic 
area within which there exist substantial limitations on the construction, sealing, repair, 
and location of wells (Minn. Rule 4725.3650; US EPA 2007, 10; MPCA 2007, 3).  Per 
conversations with well drillers licensed to drill in and out of the SWCA in Washington 
County (McCullough, phone conversation on 10/31/07; Sampson, phone conversation on 
11/1/07), the costs of drilling a new residential well inside the SWCA range from $5,000 
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to $20,000 more than drilling a well just outside of the SWCA border.  This cost increase 
arises primarily because of licensing restrictions and additional inspections; the 
equipment used and the depth of drilling are virtually identical inside and, for example, 
one-half a mile outside the SWCA.      
 Importantly, house location in the SWCA does not always imply any significant 
increased risk of groundwater contamination, compared to house location outside the 
SWCA. The original SWCA is shown in Figure 2, and the expanded SWCA is shown in 
Figure 3.  Additionally, Figures 4 and 5 show the expanded SWCA in relation to the 5 
µg/L plume contours in years 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003.  The SWCA is presently a 
12.5 square-mile area surrounding the Baytown Site and does not perfectly match the 
known contaminant plumes at this site. According to a Minnesota Department of Health 
summary of the Baytown site published in April 2006, “The SWCA includes a generous 
border area outside the plume.  Many wells within the SWCA are too far from the plume 
to be affected [by TCE contamination]” (MDH, 2006, 1).  Furthermore, according to 
conversation with a Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) hydrologist intimately 
familiar with the site, the SWCA includes some houses that have a “very, very low 
probability” of ever having their groundwater contaminated from the Baytown Site’s 
contaminant source.  As Figure 4 and Figure 5 show, the SWCA is drawn along county 
quadrant and half-quadrant borders, while the plume itself is not nearly so well-behaved. 
 The second component of the SWCA is the statutory requirement of disclosure to 
prospective buyers whether the property is located in the SWCA, if it is not served by a 
municipal water supply or has an unsealed well.  Passed in 2003, this statute may have 
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changed the amount or nature of information present in the market regarding groundwater 
quality.  One goal of this paper is to determine whether there is a difference in the effect 
of actual groundwater contamination on house prices and the effect of location in the 
SWCA, because a house could be in the SWCA and not have any TCE contamination 
problems whatsoever.  The question is: if the market reacts to possible water 
contamination, does it react only where houses have a reasonable possibility of water 
contamination, or does it react to the larger, legislatively-defined zone, the SWCA, in 
which some houses do not a reasonable possibility of water contamination?  It is worth 
noting that, in this paper, having a “reasonable possibility of water contamination” is 
based off of MPCA investigations and conclusions.  The market could, of course, have a 
different opinion about which houses have a “reasonable possibility of water 
contamination.” 
Changing the Human Risk Limit 
 Other legislation might have effects as well.  In January 2002, responding to a 
draft US EPA health risk assessment for TCE, Minnesota Department of Health changed 
the human risk limit (HRL) from 30 µg/L (micrograms per liter) to 5 µg/L.  This resulted 
in an increase in the area of concern; the change in the HRL directly caused the 
expansion of the SWCA discussed in section 2.2.  Many more residential wells suddenly 
were classified as having groundwater with TCE above the HRL, in accordance with the 
newly adopted limit.  Anecdotal evidence gleaned from local newspaper articles and 
conversations with residents indicates that residents reacted with some trepidation.  There 
are accounts of residents using bottled water for all domestic (including pet) consumption 
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despite having brand new GAC filters installed (AP 2002b,1) and other residents 
worrying that the water they consumed while the HRL was at 30 µg/L would have long-
term negative health consequences (AP 2002a,1).  In fact, the change in HRL and the 
consequential expansion of the Baytown site’s area of concern generated more newspaper 
articles than any other single event related to this site.  If nothing else, the increased 
media coverage probably created a greater public awareness of the possibility of 
groundwater contamination in the area. 
 This change in the human risk limit might have consequences in the real estate 
market.  For one, the change might induce people to mistrust any human risk limit for 
TCE determined by governmental agencies.  As a result, even if Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency (MPCA) declares that some houses have no reasonable probability of 
future contamination, potential buyers might still believe that those houses do face some 
risk.  Also, as a result of this change, market participants might conclude that no human 
risk limit set by the MPCA is reliable, that homes that are outside the SWCA might 
eventually be inside the SWCA, or that the plume will spread in the future.  Because the 
SWCA was expanded once before, it might be expanded again, and because the human 
risk limit was lowered once, it might be lowered again.  Homebuyers considering moving 
into Washington County might conclude that the real price of property with a private well 
in the county is the nominal price plus the cost of filtered water.   
 Second, the lower HRL resulted in many more houses qualifying for MPCA-
financed GAC filters; houses that existed on property platted before April 9, 2002, and 
had private wells using water above the HRL received MPCA-financed GAC filters.  On 
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average, each filter costs $1500 to install and $450 every two to six years for change-out 
and maintenance (MPCA, 2007b, 10; MPCA 2007b, 2).  Any wells installed on property 
platted after April 9, 2002, however, that tapped water above the HRL would be required 
to have GAC systems that would not be financed by MPCA.   
Methods and Data 
I follow Rosen’s (1974) hedonic model, which assumes that consumers maximize 
utility by choosing the characteristics of the house they buy, given a competitive housing 
market with a continuous equilibrium price schedule for house characteristics.  
Consumers can affect the price they pay by choosing which house and bundled 
characteristics they buy, but they cannot affect the equilibrium price schedule (Palmquist, 
2003, 3 – 4).  Consumers are therefore price-schedule-takers. 
 Empirically, the hedonic model is estimated by using data on the prices of houses 
and their characteristics, such as bedrooms, bathrooms, square footage, etc.  One 
innovation of this research is the inclusion of multiple variables which measure 
information regarding the probability that a particular house has or will eventually have 
contaminated groundwater.  These variables, mit and sit, standing for “measured and not 
filtered” and “SWCA,” indicate whether a house had a TCE reading of its well water 
done (as reported by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency) at any time prior to the 
sale and whether a house is located inside the SWCA, respectively2.  The hedonic model 
attempts to predict house prices by quantifying and estimating the marginal prices of all 
observable house characteristics, while assuming there is an unobserved stochastic 
                                                 
2
 I use “measured and not filtered” as a variable rather than the more obvious variable, “measured TCE 
level,” because of the possibility of measurement error in the latter.  See Section 3.3 for more on this. 
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element.  The functional form of the hedonic estimation (linear, semi-log, log-linear, etc.) 
is not made obvious by the underlying hedonic model and must be determined by the 
data.  Cropper et al (1988) found in simulation studies of the accuracy of various 
functional forms in predicting marginal component prices that the linear Box-Cox and 
simpler forms, such as linear or semi-log forms, performed best (Cropper et al, 1988).  In 
this paper, a semi-log functional form was chosen.  The estimation equation is: 
ititititiitit Tsmyxp ετσµγβα ++++++=       (Eq. 1) 
where: 
pit = natural log of adjusted price of house i at time t (nominal price was adjusted by a 
GDP deflator, base year 2000) 
xit = physical characteristics of the house (square footage, bathrooms, age, etc…) 
yi = locational attributes of the house  
mit = “measured and no filter” dummy, equal to 1 if house i had its well tested for TCE 
prior to time t and did not receive a GAC filter prior to time t 
sit  = SWCA dummy, equal to 1 if location of house i is in the SWCA at time t, 0 
otherwise 
Tit= time dummy, equal to 1 if sale of house i at time t occurred in year T 
ε = iid disturbance term capturing other factors determining housing price 
 The primary variables of interest in this baseline specification are sit and mit.  The 
coefficients on these variables will provide tests of the three hypotheses: no information, 
incomplete information, and complete information.  Table 2 below presents the 
hypotheses and the conditions for rejection. 
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Table 2: Null Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Tested Variable(s) of Interest and Their 
Coefficients (in parentheses) 
Reject if: 
Hypothesis 1: There is no 
information about groundwater 
in the market. 
SWCA dummy: sit (σ); measured 
and no filter dummy: mit (µ) 
σ ≠ 0 or µ ≠ 0 
Hypothesis 2: There is 
incomplete information about 
groundwater in the market. 
sit(σ), mit (µ) σ ≠ 0 and µ = 0 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is 
complete information about 
groundwater in the market. 
sit(σ), mit (µ) µ = 0 
 
These hypothesis tests rely on two assumptions.  The first assumption is that GAC filters 
effectively render water at houses free of TCE.  The second assumption is that mit is a 
fairly accurate proxy for the probability that a house might ever have contaminated 
groundwater.   
Two important estimation issues must be addressed before we can rely on the 
estimates of the hedonic model: spatial extent of the housing market and stability over 
time of parameter estimates.   
Spatial Extent of the Market 
 The hedonic model estimates an equilibrium price schedule for house components 
in a single market.  Problems can occur when separate markets are treated as one single 
market, particularly when the variable of interest is observed only in one of the markets.  
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According to Palmquist, “if there are a reasonable number of consumers who would 
consider the alternative areas [as substitutes], then those areas can be treated as a single 
market, even if many people only consider one or the other [area]” (Palmquist, 2003, 26).  
Nevertheless, most researchers consider an urban area to be a single market, and urban 
areas often encompass multiple counties.  I treat the entirety of Washington County as a 
single market in all specifications reported in this draft of the paper.  Alternative 
specifications were investigated, such as using only the central portion of the county, 
which centers on the plume.  The results do not differ substantially; all coefficient 
estimates are similar in sign and significance levels.   
Stability Over Time 
 More important to this study is whether the values of the various characteristics of 
houses are relatively stable over the period studied, and, if they are not stable, whether 
this affects my estimates on the variables of interest.  I test information levels regarding 
groundwater quality present in the real estate market by estimating changes in the 
coefficients on sit and mit after certain events which might alter the content and amount of 
information present in the market, such as the expansion of the SWCA and the enactment 
of the SWCA disclosure law.  These estimates will be valid only if the contributions of 
the other house characteristics to the value of the house are stable over time (Palmquist 
2003, 26) or if the contributions of other house characteristics are orthogonal to the 
coefficients of interest.  The time period for which I collected data is from January 1, 
1980, to Dec. 31, 2006.  Any pooling of data over this entire time period would likely be 
inappropriate, because the housing market in Washington County changed drastically 
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over the same period.  In the 1980’s, Washington County was largely agricultural.  
However, in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, large farms were gradually split into 
suburban-type subdivisions due to the expansion of nearby St. Paul, MN3.   
 In this draft, I have pooled data from 1995 through 2006; judging by, it appears 
that after 1995 the average parcel size in each year had stabilized, indicating that the 
housing market remains relatively consistent thereafter. 
Data 
 House sales and house characteristic data were taken from the Washington 
County Tax Assessor’s website.  Government legislation variables, such as the 
delineation of the SWCA, were created using various sources including MPCA and MDH 
documents and their websites.  I have included all houses that were sold between Jan. 1, 
1995 and Dec. 31, 2006, except townhouses, condominiums, and apartments, because 
these types are typically sold bundled with unobservable (to the econometrician) home 
owners’ association payments.  Table 3 summarizes the house sales and characteristic 
variables, location variables, and water quality variables.  The data are divided into two 
time periods, 1995 – 2002 and 2003 – 2006, because of the events that occur in 2002 
related to changing the HRL, and because the disclosure law went into effect at the 
beginning of 2003.  Summary statistics for each period are shown in Table 4 and Table 5.  
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency provided its well sampling data for those 
houses in and around the SWCA that had their TCE levels measured.   
                                                 
3
 Despite this suburbanization process, there remain large amounts of unused parcels and agricultural lands 
in the county.   
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 Information regarding groundwater quality can enter the market in multiple ways.  
If there existed complete information in the market and market participants valued 
uncontaminated water, then we should expect the actual measured contaminant level to 
consistently reflect this with a negative coefficient estimate when entered in the hedonic 
model.  Furthermore, assuming that the GAC filter systems perfectly remove all TCE 
prior to water consumption, then we should expect to see the negative coefficient 
estimate on the measured contaminant level variable
 
decrease after the year 2002, when 
most of the filter systems were installed on those houses with more than 5 µg/l TCE4.  
However, a data issue prevents reliable direct estimation of the effect of measured 
contamination on house prices. 
   The data issue preventing the direct estimate of the effect of measured 
contaminant levels is the possibility of measurement error in the measured contaminant 
level variable.  Not all houses in the dataset were actually measured for TCE; in fact, not 
even all houses inside the SWCA were measured for TCE.  The Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency tests those houses that are most likely to have TCE contamination; the 
decision on which houses are most likely to have TCE contamination is presumably 
based on knowledge of where the plume actually is, which aquifer a residential well uses, 
and where the plume is most likely to spread.  While this cost-minimizing water testing 
strategy might be effective in terms of preventing residents from consuming water with 
more than 5 µg/l TCE, it does not provide actual measurements at all houses in the 
dataset.  It is probably the case that all houses with high levels of TCE were tested, but 
                                                 
4
 There were 162 GAC filter systems installed by the end of 2006.  120 of these were installed in the year 
2002.   
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there is still the possibility that some houses with low (less than 1 µg/l) levels of TCE did 
not get tested.  It would be dubious science to make the assumption that any house that 
did not get tested has zero TCE.   
 Despite this issue, tests of information levels in the housing market are still 
possible.  A source of information about whether a house has contaminated water or is 
likely to have contaminated water in the future is whether a house had its water tested by 
the MPCA.  The MPCA tests water at those houses most likely to have TCE 
contamination, and the dataset contains records of which houses were tested and when.  
Thus, mit, a dummy equal to unity if a house had its water tested prior to the sale and did 
not have a GAC filter installed prior to the sale, contains information about the MPCA’s 
opinion of the probability of TCE contamination without any measurement error.  The 
information relayed to the market is that those houses that were tested were deemed most 
likely to have contaminated water by the MPCA.  There are 214 sales of houses between 
1995 and 2006 that occurred after the house had its TCE level measured in the dataset.  
Under the assumption that the GAC filter systems perfectly reduce the probability of 
TCE contamination to zero, observations of house sales where the water was tested and a 
filter was installed prior to the sale receive a value of zero for mit.  20 of the 214 sales of 
measured houses occur after a GAC filter system has been installed in the house.  As a 
result, there are 194 observations of sales of measured and unfiltered houses in the 
dataset.   Houses that have their TCE tested are also likely to be situated near monitoring 
wells and other possible visible indicators of possible water contamination.  It is thus 
reasonable to think that potential homebuyers could be more worried about possible TCE 
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contamination at those homes that were measured than at those homes that were not.  I 
am thus putting all houses into two categories: those with possible contamination issues, 
and those without.  Houses that had their TCE measured and never got a filter installed 
are in the first category.  Houses that never were measured and houses that were 
measured and had filters installed are in the second category.   
 A second source of information regarding possible water contamination is 
location of a house in the SWCA.  This is particularly pertinent after the SWCA 
disclosure law went into effect at the beginning of 2003.  Under the SWCA disclosure 
law, sellers of homes in the SWCA must disclose that the house is in the SWCA to 
homebuyers at the time of contract signing.  Location in the SWCA does not necessarily 
mean that a house has contaminated water.  Houses can be inside the SWCA and still 
have zero TCE in their water.  Also, some houses inside the SWCA never had their water 
tested.  A dummy variable, sit, indicates whether a house is inside the SWCA at the time 
of the sale.  By examining the effect of location in the SWCA, sit, and the effect of 
whether a house’s water was measured, mit, before and after the disclosure law goes into 
effect, it is possible to determine whether the market discounted houses that the MPCA 
tested and did not install filters on, implying the possibility of present or future 
contamination (mit = 1), regardless of the SWCA, or whether the market discounted 
houses that were located in the SWCA (sit = 1), regardless of whether the MPCA decided 
the house needed its water measured. 
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Outliers and Erroneous Data 
 Tax assessors’ sales data often include probable non-market transactions, 
suggested by the fact that 561 different observations of sales of three-bedroom houses 
have recorded prices of $0.00.  There are possibly other non-market transactions, such as 
sales of $1.00, $10.00, or even $100.00, which likely represent intra-family trade, shifting 
of nominal ownership for tax purposes, or refinancing.  These must be dropped or 
weighted in a logical and reproducible manner. 
 There is also the possibility of erroneous sale records at the upper end of the price 
range.  Any attempt to normalize the distribution of price observations will have to 
address both tails of the price distribution.  I addressed this in two steps.  First, I dropped 
those observations that seemed, in my judgment, obviously either erroneous or non-
market transactions at the bottom end of the price distribution.  Accordingly, all 
observations of sales at nominal price of less than $1001 were dropped (1087 
observations).  Secondly, all houses with an age (calculated as year sold less year built) 
of less than negative three were dropped on suspicion of erroneous entry (667 obs.).  
There was also a group of houses that had two sales recorded for the same house on the 
same day at vastly different prices.  These were dropped (634 obs.).  Finally, because 
1087 observations were dropped somewhat arbitrarily from the bottom end of the price 
distribution, the 1087 observations with the highest adjusted prices were dropped. 
The second step taken to deal with outliers is the implementation of quantile 
regressions, which “emphasize the middle of the distribution rather than the tails” (Evans, 
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2007, 18).  All regressions reported in this draft are the results of quantile regressions at 
the median.   
Results 
 The three hypotheses regarding information levels in the market were tested using 
quantile regressions at the median of adjusted house price.  All results reported in this 
draft are from regressions done in the semi-log functional form5.   
 Table 6 shows the results of quantile regressions at the adjusted house price 
median designed to test whether “measured and not filtered,” mit, or SWCA, sit, inform 
the market about water quality, and whether this changes after the events of 2002 and the 
implementation of the disclosure law at the beginning of 2003.  The events of 2002 are: 
the human risk limit (HRL) is lowered from 30 µg/l to 5 µg/l; the SWCA is expanded; 
120 out of 162 GAC filters are installed; more newspaper articles about the Baytown Site 
are written than any other year; and multiple town meetings occur due to residents’ 
concerns about health risk and property values.  I have divided all sales into two time 
periods: 1995 – 2002 and 2003 – 2006.  Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show the coefficient 
estimates from a quantile regression including township fixed effects.  Column 1 is for 
period 1, 1995 – 2002, and Column 2 is for period 2, 2003 – 2006.  All housing and 
location variables have the expected signs and most are significant in both periods, and 
for brevity I will focus the following discourse on only the variables of interest.   
                                                 
5
 For robustness, ordinary least squares regressions in the semi-log form were also performed.  Results of 
OLS had the same signs and significance levels, but the magnitudes of some coefficient estimates of the 
variables of interest were greater than in quantile regressions.  Quantile regression results are reported 
because of possible outlier influence.   
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The variables read_nofilt and swca represent mit and sit, the variables of interest.   
The coefficient estimate of read_nofilt in the first period, 1995 – 2002, is approximately  
-0.135, or -13.5%, while that of swca is approximately 0.07, or 7%; both are significant at 
the 5% level.  As these are both binary variables, houses could be in one of four 
categories: measured, unfiltered, and in the SWCA; measured, unfiltered, and not in the 
SWCA; not measured (or measured and filtered) and in the SWCA; and not measured (or 
measured and filtered) and not in the SWCA.  The net effects, corresponding to the 
summed appropriate coefficient estimates from Table 6, for the four groups are summed 
in Table 7.  Wald tests of joint significance of read_nofilt and swca show that the 
negative, net effect in Period 1 on Group 1 is significant; in Period 2, it is not. 
The positive and significant coefficient on swca indicates that there is likely some 
omitted variable, some characteristic of the neighborhoods in SWCA that makes them 
valuable relative to those that are not in SWCA, while the negative coefficient on 
read_nofilt indicates that houses with the possibility of contaminated water sold at a 
discount in this period.  One possible explanation for this positive and significant 
coefficient on swca (the “SWCA premium”) could arise from the additional well-drilling 
costs that the SWCA legislation creates.  According to local drillers (McCullough, 2007; 
Sampson, 2007), the cost of drilling a new residential well inside the SWCA could be 
from $5000 to $20000 more than drilling a similar well outside the SWCA.  The “SWCA 
premium” does not offset the “tainted water” discount for those houses that get both; on 
net, as shown in Table 7, houses inside the SWCA that were measured and not filtered 
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sold for 6.5% less than houses outside the SWCA that were not measured, at the median.  
That implies a $10,000 “tainted water” discount at the median in Period 1. 
 Regardless of whatever omitted variable is causing the “SWCA premium” in the 
first period, it appears that the housing market reacts to the information captured by the 
read_nofilt variable.  There is no SWCA disclosure law in place in this period, so market 
participants could feasibly have little information about the legislation delineating a 
certain area as a special well construction area.  Market participants react to the 
information produced by the selection of houses for measurement: those houses that are 
tested are also those most likely to have TCE contamination and therefore suffer the 
“tainted water” discount.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that there is complete 
information in the market in Period 1. 
 Column 2 shows the results of the same regression run for houses sold in the 
second period, 2003 – 2006.  During this entire period, the SWCA disclosure law was in 
effect.  The coefficient estimate on read_nofilt in the second period is not statistically 
different from zero.  Compared to the first period, the coefficient estimate on read_nofilt 
increased by about 11%.  The coefficient estimate on swca is also not statistically 
different from zero.  Compared to the first period, the coefficient estimate on swca 
decreased by about 6.8%.   
 One possible explanation for the read_nofilt and swca coefficients converging to 
zero in the second period is the SWCA disclosure law.  In the first period, the market 
reacted to the MPCA’s choice of which houses to measure, but after the disclosure law 
goes into effect, market participants change their view on which houses might have 
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“tainted water.”  In the second period, the market discounts all homes that are in the 
SWCA, thereby reducing the “SWCA premium” witnessed in the first period to zero in 
the second period.  It no longer mattered whether a house has been measured or not; the 
disclosure law indicated to market participants that location in the SWCA meant a house 
might have “tainted water.”  All houses in the SWCA in the second period still possess 
whatever characteristic created the “SWCA premium” in the first period, but in the 
second period all houses in the SWCA also suffer from the “tainted water” discount.  On 
net, the “SWCA premium” and “tainted water” discount nullify each other for all houses 
in the SWCA, making them no different from houses outside the SWCA.    
 Columns 3 and 4 show the results of quantile regressions with township fixed 
effects as well as property tax group fixed effects, both for robustness and to attempt to 
solve the omitted variable issue causing the “SWCA premium” in the first period.  
Property taxes in Washington County are a function of three location variables: 
watershed, school district, and township.  I thus added in a tax group fixed effect for 
every unique combination of the three variables, for a total of 82 different tax groups in 
the dataset.  The results from these regressions are quite similar to those in Columns 1 
and 2.   
These results point to a rejection of the first hypothesis, that there is no 
information regarding groundwater quality in the housing market.  In the first period, 
houses that were measured for TCE sold at a substantial discount relative to those that 
were not measured, indicating both that there was information about the TCE 
contamination in the market and that market participants valued uncontaminated water.  
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Also, in the first period, houses that were located inside the SWCA sold at a premium 
compared to those outside the SWCA.  In the second period, while the houses that were 
measured no longer sold at a discount, the premium for location inside the SWCA also 
disappears.  The disappearance of the premium indicates that the source of information 
relied upon by market participants shifted from MPCA measurements to location in the 
SWCA.  Because sales of houses located in the SWCA had to be accompanied by formal 
disclosure that the house is in the SWCA beginning in 2003, the cost to a potential buyer 
of learning whether a house was in the SWCA effectively fell to zero, while the cost of 
learning whether a house had ever been tested for TCE remained constant.  This 
reduction in the cost of information for one indicator of possibly contaminated water 
induced market participants to use that indicator in their decisions.      
In the first period, the results are consistent with the third hypothesis, that there is 
complete information in the market.  The “tainted water” discount is concentrated at 
those homes that were deemed the most probable to have contaminated water by the 
MPCA.  The less accurate, in terms of indicating which homes have a possibility of 
contamination, proxy swca does not appear to capture the “tainted water” discount in the 
first period.   
In the second period, however, the reduction in the cost of learning whether a 
house is in the SWCA resulted in a proxy containing incomplete information being 
utilized in the market.  The “tainted water” discount is no longer captured by the more 
accurate “measured and not filtered” variable; instead, the swca variable drops decreases 
from a statistically significant +7% in the first period to zero in the second period. These 
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results indicate, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the cost of gathering information is 
important in determining what information is incorporated into market prices.  The 
lowering of the cost of learning whether a house is in the SWCA results in the market 
actually using a less accurate proxy for the probability of contamination than in the first 
period.  The market, in second period, incorporated incomplete information regarding 
groundwater quality because it was less costly to do so. 
An alternative interpretation of these results is that there is complete information 
in the market in both periods.  Market participants interpreted the decision by legislators 
to force disclosure of location in the SWCA as a signal that the water contamination 
might be wider spread than they thought in the first period.  If this is the case, the market 
is forecasting that the plume will spread farther yet; in fact, there has been some minor 
spreading of the plume to the east, but overall it has remained relatively stable.  Only 
future mappings of the plume will allow a test of whether the impact of the disclosure law 
was a result of a change from complete information to incomplete information or a result 
of the addition of new, correct information to the market.  That is, if the plume does 
expand in the future, then the market was indeed forecasting correctly when those homes 
assumed here to be “at no risk of contamination” but still located in the SWCA lost some 
value. 
Net Cost of Regulation 
 Prior to the passage of the disclosure law, the net effect of both the SWCA and 
house water tests by the MPCA was in fact positive.  This occurs because of the SWCA 
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premium – houses in the SWCA that did not have their water tested sold for $12,483.66 
more than the average house during period 1 (1995 – 2002).   
The affected houses fall into three different categories: in the SWCA and tested; 
outside the SWCA and tested; and in the SWCA and not tested.  Of the three categories, 
the largest group is the “in the SWCA and not tested” group (see Table 7, which shows 
the number of observations in each group in each time period).  To determine the net 
effect of regulation, I calculated the realized net effect of the SWCA and water testing in 
each period for all the groups.  The realized net effect is the actual number of house sales 
in each group in the time period multiplied by the premium or discount for each group in 
each time period, evaluated at the mean price for the period.  A calculation of realized 
costs or benefits from the net effect of the SWCA and water testing before and after the 
disclosure law passed at the beginning of 2003 yields the following numbers: prior to the 
disclosure law’s passage, the net effect was positive at $2,263,822.79.  This does not 
imply that groundwater contamination imparted value to the neighborhood.  Instead, it 
shows that some missing variable gives houses in the SWCA the SWCA premium, and 
that effect dominates the tainted water discount.  After the new regulation passes, the net 
effect was negative at -$779,717.62.  This is likely an underestimation: time period 1 
includes eight years of sale observations (1995 – 2002) while time period 2 includes only 
four years (2003 – 2006).  An equal number of years in period 2 as period 1 would 
decrease the net effect even more, assuming the discounts in each group remain the same. 
Conclusions 
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 In this paper, I have tested information levels regarding groundwater quality and 
their effects on house prices.  Using tax assessor real estate data, GIS data, and data on 
which houses were chosen for testing for contaminants by the Minnesota Pollution 
Control Agency and when they were tested, the results indicate that, prior to the passage 
of a disclosure law mandating that homesellers inform homebuyers about a house’s 
location in a special well construction area (SWCA), the real estate market incorporates 
complete information about where trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination is likely to 
occur.  Only those houses that the MPCA tested because they are the most likely to have 
contaminated water suffered a “tainted water” discount during this time period.  After the 
disclosure law passes, the market incorporates incomplete information about where TCE 
is likely to occur.  This might occur because the disclosure law offers a very low-cost 
way of gathering information about groundwater quality, and, as a result, all houses in the 
legislatively-created special well construction area (SWCA) suffer a “tainted water” 
discount despite many of those house having uncontaminated water and little to no 
possibility of future contamination.   
 An alternative interpretation of the shift of the “tainted water” discount from those 
houses that were tested by the MPCA to all houses in the SWCA is that the disclosure 
law informed the market that the plume might spread to other houses in the SWCA.  
Thus, if the plume spreads to those houses in the SWCA that presently have no 
contamination and are viewed by the MPCA as having no risk of contamination, then the 
market would have predicted this.  To date, however, the plume has spread little, while 
the disclosure law was passed in 2003.   
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 These results emphasize the importance of information in markets.  Many 
researchers have studied market reactions to potentially harmful environmental 
disamenities; often, these market reactions are cited as evidence of non-economic 
behavior on the part of market participants.  Few studies, however, have questioned the 
assumption that market participants possess complete information about the 
environmental disamenity (a notable exception is Pope, 2007).  Information acquisition 
can be costly.  When markets react in ways that researchers find odd or “irrational,” it 
could simply be the case that markets react to incomplete information because gathering 
complete information is too costly.   
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Figure 2.1: Location of Washington County in Minnesota 
 
 
 
Notes: Washington County abuts the St. Croix river on the east, and St. Paul on the west.  It is shaded in the 
figure above. 
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Figure 2.2: Original SWCA 
 
−
2,000 0 2,0001,000 Meters
 
Notes: The solid black line shows the border of the SWCA prior to its expansion in 2002. 
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Figure 2.3: Expanded SWCA 
−
2,000 0 2,0001,000 Meters
 
Notes: The dotted line shows the border of the SWCA after its expansion in 2002.  The solid black line 
shows the old border of the SWCA on the west and southern ends, where the expansion took place.  The 
expanded SWCA is 12.5 square miles.
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Figure 2.4: Expanded SWCA and the 5 microgram per liter TCE contour in Jordan aquifer. 
 
Notes: This shows the 5 µg/l TCE contour in the Jordan aquifer in years 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2003.  The 
edges of the contour change somewhat across years, particularly in the east near the St. Croix River and 
Bayport.   The dotted line around the perimeter is the expanded SWCA.  Source: Wenck Associates, Inc.   
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Figure 2.5: Expanded SWCA and the 5 microgram per liter TCE contour in Prairie Du Chien aquifer. 
 
Notes: This shows the 5 µg/l TCE contour in the Prairie Du Chien contour in years 1999, 2001, 2002, and 
2003.  The edges of the contour are relatively stable across time. The dotted line around the perimeter is the 
expanded SWCA.  Source: Wenck Associates, Inc.   
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Table 2.1: Chronology of Site Events. 
 
Date Event 
6/1987 MDH sampling of private water wells surrounding the Baytown Dump detects several 
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), including TCE and CCl4. 
5/1988 MDH establishes the SWCA. 
1988 Site listed on the Minnesota Permanent List of Priorities (PLP). 
12/16/1994 Site listed on the National Priorities List (NPL). 
6/1995 MPCA assumed full responsibility for oversight of Site under the Enforcement Deferral 
Pilot Project. 
1999 Consent Order 
4/1999 Feasibility Study (FS) completed for the site. 
5/1999 Proposed Plan published. 
5/2000 EPA and MPCA executed a Record of Decision (ROD). 
1999 to 
present 
Site wide water sampling and GAC installation initiated. 
1988 to 2001 Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) conducted investigations at and near Lake 
Elmo Airport. 
2002 MDH changes human risk limit for TCE from 30 micrograms/liter to 5 micrograms/liter.   
2002 MPCA expands SWCA in accordance with new human risk limit. 
2002 to 2004 MPCA conducts investigations designed to identify TCE source area. 
2004 MPCA investigations succeed in locating primary TCE source area. 
2004 to 
present 
MPCA conducts investigation designed to further delineate the nature and extent of the 
TCE source area and to characterize the site. 
2/2005 Feasibility study completed for TCE plume containment near source. 
2005 to 
present 
MPCA pursuing design, approval, and implementation of remedial actions addressing the 
groundwater contamination plume and source area. 
 
Source: MPCA Five-Year Review Report: First Five-Year Review Report, 2007, p.2. 
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 Table 2.3: Definitions of Variables 
Variable Definition 
realprice GDP deflator-adjusted sale price of the house, in dollars  
lnprice natural log of realprice 
date date of sale 
age age of house at time of sale = year sold less year built; negative 
values of age were changed to zero. 
agesq newage squared 
T.L.A. total living area, in square feet 
Lot Area size of parcel, in square feet 
beds number of bedrooms 
full number of full bathrooms 
half number of half bathrooms 
threequart number of ¾ bathrooms 
deluxe number of deluxe bathrooms 
fireplace number of fireplaces 
add1 area of 1st addition  in square feet, if it existed at time of sale 
addn area of nth addition  in square feet, if it existed at time of sale 
add_n dummy indicating presence of nth addition on the house at time 
of sale 
gar1 area of 1st garage in square feet, if it existed at time of sale 
garn area of nth garage in square feet, if it existed at time of sale 
ac dummy indicating presence of central air-conditioning system 
porcharea area of porch(es) in square feet 
deckarea area of deck or patio in square feet 
river_dist convex index between 0 and 1 indicating proximity of a house 
to a river.  river_dist = max[1-(d/dmax)1/2,0] where d is the 
distance to the nearest river in meters and dmax is set to 500 
meters.  If d>500, river_dist=0.   
lake_dist convex index between 0 and 1 indicating proximity of a house 
to a river.  lake_dist = max[1-(d/dmax)1/2,0] where d is the 
distance to the nearest lake in meters and dmax is set to 500 
meters.  If d>500, lake_dist=0.   
read_nofilt dummy variable equal to one if a house had its TCE level 
measured by the MPCA prior to sale and had not received a 
GAC filter system, zero otherwise. 
swca dummy variable indicating location inside the SWCA at time of 
sale 
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics, Period 1, Years 1995 - 2002 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
realprice 18608 178338 156251.2 90850.73 2096.143 647870.1 
lnreal 18608 11.96498 11.95922 0.524272 7.647854 13.38145 
full 18608 1.256286 1 0.57005 0 6 
threequart 18608 0.481407 0 0.558144 0 4 
half 18608 0.336993 0 0.481599 0 3 
deluxe 18608 0.205092 0 0.40543 0 2 
beds 18608 3.123087 3 0.88708 1 12 
tla 18608 1570.115 1362 642.9056 112 8800 
lotarea 18608 40698.53 11744 112030.2 0 2792196 
age 18608 18.39724 8 27.02399 0 154 
agesq 18608 1068.725 64 2864.931 0 23716 
fireplace 18608 0.694763 1 0.687561 0 5 
ac 18608 0.872073 1 0.334015 0 1 
porcharea 18608 55.24657 0 97.38714 0 2011 
deckarea 18608 103.0443 0 133.2517 0 1000 
district1 18608 0.006335 0 0.079344 0 1 
district2 18608 0.209657 0 0.407071 0 1 
district3 18608 0.054657 0 0.227314 0 1 
district5 18608 0.111046 0 0.314195 0 1 
district6 18608 0.069531 0 0.254361 0 1 
district7 18608 0.289852 0 0.453702 0 1 
district8 18608 0.253374 0 0.434952 0 1 
district9 18608 0.0024 0 0.048936 0 1 
watershed2 18608 0.015223 0 0.122443 0 1 
watershed3 18608 0.072352 0 0.259076 0 1 
watershed4 18608 0.078982 0 0.269716 0 1 
watershed5 18608 0.145891 0 0.353004 0 1 
watershed6 18608 0.32313 0 0.467681 0 1 
river_dist 18608 0.026398 0 0.131944 0 0.980238 
lake_dist 18608 0.02149 0 0.10969 0 0.949659 
add1 18608 128.2661 35 204.3049 0 2368 
add2 18608 24.2806 0 78.89728 0 1484 
add3 18608 4.07382 0 33.31759 0 960 
add4 18608 0.021446 0 1.274798 0 128 
gar1 18608 507.612 505 247.7878 0 2800 
gar2 18608 17.30528 0 118.2749 0 2480 
gar3 18608 0.104199 0 6.195348 0 624 
swca 18608 0.015347 0 0.122929 0 1 
read_nofilt 18608 0.004289 0 0.065352 0 1 
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics, Period 2, Years 2003 – 2006 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
realprice 11861 273248.2 245513.5 115992.2 1882.931 744213.6 
lnreal 11861 12.43498 12.41111 0.408489 7.540585 13.52008 
full 11861 1.173101 1 0.499099 0 6 
threequart 11861 0.483571 0 0.578756 0 3 
half 11861 0.447964 0 0.511421 0 3 
deluxe 11861 0.347451 0 0.478009 0 2 
beds 11861 3.221077 3 0.903566 1 12 
tla 11861 1691.737 1518 682.6022 140 7560 
lotarea 11861 26485.17 10152 83698.71 0 2586379 
age 11861 19.95127 11 26.20608 0 158 
agesq 11861 1084.769 121 2867.64 0 24964 
fireplace 11861 0.755497 1 0.664921 0 5 
ac 11861 0.899175 1 0.301106 0 1 
porcharea 11861 58.87419 0 89.45057 0 1240 
deckarea 11861 89.33646 0 128.4225 0 772 
district1 11861 0.006747 0 0.081863 0 1 
district2 11861 0.158358 0 0.365088 0 1 
district3 11861 0.049475 0 0.216865 0 1 
district5 11861 0.115505 0 0.31964 0 1 
district6 11861 0.044041 0 0.205192 0 1 
district7 11861 0.412606 0 0.492319 0 1 
district8 11861 0.210145 0 0.407424 0 1 
district9 11861 0.001874 0 0.043251 0 1 
watershed2 11861 0.011712 0 0.107589 0 1 
watershed3 11861 0.057714 0 0.233209 0 1 
watershed4 11861 0.115687 0 0.31986 0 1 
watershed5 11861 0.143601 0 0.350696 0 1 
watershed6 11861 0.420262 0 0.493617 0 1 
river_dist 11861 0.019978 0 0.115476 0 0.98288 
lake_dist 11861 0.015331 0 0.092069 0 0.961194 
add1 11861 128.1496 40 195.1575 0 2112 
add2 11861 33.82003 0 94.60141 0 1484 
add3 11861 6.868066 0 39.02542 0 810 
add4 11861 0.006184 0 0.372778 0 38 
gar1 11861 540.6867 528 226.4092 0 2800 
gar2 11861 12.99713 0 99.69175 0 2925 
gar3 11861 0.287669 0 14.4616 0 1040 
swca 11861 0.013618 0 0.115903 0 1 
read_nofilt 11861 0.002499 0 0.049927 0 1 
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Table 2.6: Quantile Regressions at Median 
  Township Fixed Effects Tax Group & Township Fixed Effects 
Dep. Var.: 
lnreal (1) Years: 1995 - 2002 (2) Years: 2003 - 2006 (3) Years: 1995 - 2002 (4) Years: 2003 - 2006 
full 0.045801 (14.35)** 0.049414 (11.46)** 0.045725 (15.00)** 0.048639 (11.16)** 
threequart 0.036883 (12.30)** 0.043968 (11.81)** 0.036158 (12.60)** 0.043213 (11.46)** 
half -0.009487 (2.73)** -0.011902 (2.73)** -0.009837 (2.96)** -0.012117 (2.74)** 
deluxe 0.083112 (16.45)** 0.119267 (19.46)** 0.078936 (16.19)** 0.117478 (18.92)** 
beds 0.022251 (12.38)** 0.027280 (11.78)** 0.023031 (13.40)** 0.027345 (11.64)** 
T.L.A. 0.000174 (50.27)** 0.000184 (41.36)** 0.000173 (52.12)** 0.000183 (40.56)** 
Lot Area 3.65e-07 (25.24)** 7.18e-07  (27.38)** 3.63e-07  (25.91)** 7.03e-07 (26.12)** 
age -0.003772 (23.50)** -0.004100 (18.31)** -0.003851 (25.04)** -0.004212 (18.56)** 
agesq 0.000015 (10.66)** 0.000019 (10.09)** 0.000016 (11.56)** 0.000020 (10.44)** 
fireplace 0.047970 (20.40)** 0.052023 (16.96)** 0.046284 (20.61)** 0.051622 (16.65)** 
ac 0.030746 (6.84)** 0.024225 (3.73)** 0.032823 (7.65)** 0.023071 (3.52)** 
porcharea 0.000266 (16.02)** 0.000380 (16.68)** 0.000264 (16.69)** 0.000368 (15.94)** 
deckarea 0.000165 (14.76)** 0.000159 (10.65)** 0.000159 (14.87)** 0.000153 (10.15)** 
river_dist 0.175309 (11.66)** 0.179480 (8.17)** 0.173309 (11.97)** 0.178966 (7.98)** 
lake_dist 0.557180 (20.82)** 0.722736 (18.32)** 0.510531 (15.39)** 0.748829 (14.63)** 
add1 0.000046 (6.63)** -0.000019 (2.07)* 0.000044 (6.68)** -0.000018 (2.02)* 
add2 0.000046 (2.69)** 0.000007 (0.36) 0.000040 (2.46)* 0.000014 (0.74) 
add3 0.000102 (2.48)* 0.000177 (4.11)** 0.000073 (1.88) 0.000203 (4.68)** 
add4 0.000987 (1.43) 0.006091 (2.80)** 0.001066 (1.62) 0.006090 (2.77)** 
gar1 0.000372 (63.12)** 0.000302 (34.61)** 0.000372 (65.89)** 0.000303 (34.30)** 
gar2 0.000106 (9.07)** 0.000107 (6.30)** 0.000115 (10.43)** 0.000108 (6.36)** 
gar3 -0.000331 (1.56) 0.000130 (1.14) -0.000161 (0.79) -0.000003 (0.03) 
read_nofilt -0.134391 (5.08)** -0.027570 (0.72) -0.142021 (5.43)** -0.001597 (0.04) 
swca 0.070558 (3.10)** -0.008068 (0.24) 0.090822 (4.17)** -0.022143 (0.62) 
Constant 11.470592 (283.42)** 11.983834 (216.60)** 10.622572 (176.74)** 11.566936 (150.19)** 
Observations 18608   11861   18608   11861   
Pseudo-R2 0.4326   0.5640   0.4359   0.5665   
 Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  Time 
dummy variables, watershed variables, and school district variables are all included in all above 
regressions; their coefficient estimates are suppressed for brevity and are available upon request. 
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Table 2.7: Net effects of read_nofilt and swca 
 Group 1: 
measured, unfiltered, 
in the SWCA, 
Group 2: 
measured, 
unfiltered, 
outside the 
SWCA 
Group 3: 
not measured 
(or measured 
and filtered), 
in the SWCA  
Group 4: 
not measured 
(or measured 
and filtered), 
not in the 
SWCA 
Period 1 -13.4% + 7% = -6.4% -13.4% +7% baseline (0) 
Observations 94 15 296 18308 
Period 2 -2.8% -0.8% =  -3.6% -2.8% -0.8% baseline (0) 
Observations 38 2 180 11641 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
DO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS ACTUALLY WORK? ISSUES IN 
UNDERSTANDING THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE GROWTH OF 
REGIONALISM 
 
Introduction 
 
 One of the most notable events of the world economy over the past twenty years 
has been the phenomenal growth in the number of international economic integration 
agreements (EIAs). EIAs are treaties between economic units – in the case of 
international EIAs, between nations – to reduce policy-controlled barriers to the flow of 
goods, services, capital, labor, etc. Most – though not all – EIAs tend to be “regional” (or 
continental) in scope and most tend to be free (or preferential) trade agreements 
(henceforth, FTAs). According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) website, in 2006 
there are approximately 300 regional trade agreements that are either planned, have 
concluded negotiations, or are in force. Interestingly, of the 250 agreements notified to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and WTO between 1947-2002, 
about half were notified since 1995. Thus, there has been a virtual explosion in the 
number of EIAs in the past decade. This is the “latest wave” of regional trade and 
cooperation agreements that comes on the heels of the 50th anniversary of the most noted 
economic integration agreement of modern times, the1957 Treaty of Rome. 
 This wave has culminated in – what Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya 
(1999) have famously termed – a seeming “spaghetti bowl” of EIAs. Figure 1 from 
Estevadeordal (2006) illustrates vividly this “spaghetti bowl,” with each line representing 
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an EIA between one country and another (or with a group of countries). However, one 
aim of this paper is to convince the reader that – instead of looking at this web of 
agreements as a spaghetti bowl – economists and policy makers should see this as a 
“market for regionalism.”  
 This paper synthesizes and develops further a line of research pursued by the 
authors on the causes and consequences of the growth of regionalism. In this paper, we 
hope to accomplish four goals.  First, we address conceptually why it is useful to consider 
this web of agreements as a type of “market.” In a world with approximately 200 
countries and national governments, there exist approximately 20,000 potential bilateral 
EIAs (200x199/2 = 19,900). To the extent that national governments promote the welfare 
of their nations’ firms and consumers, the rules-of-engagement in bilateral trade are 
likely determined in a highly competitive political environment. We discuss the notion of 
“competitive liberalization,” coined by Fred Bergsten more than a decade ago, and 
suggest a systematic conceptual framework for analyzing determinants of EIAs, initially 
in a static context. While bilateral trade agreements are ultimately negotiated by national 
governments, the rules are negotiated in the context of a type of “market” of 20,000 
potential bilateral agreements, which can provide potentially quite a 
competitive setting for the beneficiaries of such agreements – various nations’ firms and 
consumers – to influence their national policy makers to negotiate in a competitive 
manner. To a large extent, one might interpret our approach in the context of the “new 
institutionalism.” We discuss empirical evidence consistent with the notion that EIAs are 
determined in a competitive economic environment.   
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 Our second goal is to argue that the market for (bilateral) EIAs exists 
contemporaneously with the market for (bilateral) trade flows, obscuring ex post 
evaluation of the effects of EIAs on trade. Casual examination of trade flows and of EIAs 
suggests that the two markets are contemporaneous. Country pairs that are physically 
close and are large economically tend to have very large trade flows, e.g., U.S.- Canada 
and France-Germany. Moreover, countries that choose to form EIAs are physically close 
and are large economically, e.g., U.S.-Canada and France-Germany. However, if trade 
flows and EIAs are determined simultaneously, this raises problems for evaluating ex 
post the effects of EIAs on trade.   
 Our third goal is then to address issues concerned with providing better estimates 
of the ex post effects of EIAs on trade. While computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models have long dominated policy makers analyses of the potential economic benefits 
from changing trade policies (including formation of EIAs), such models can only 
provide ex ante forecasts of the effects of eliminating (or reducing) measurable 
government-imposed trade barriers on trade, production, consumption and welfare of a 
nation. These models cannot address what actually did happen as a result of forming a 
specific EIA.  Moreover, many have argued that CGE models have tended to 
underestimate the effects of EIAs on trade, cf., DeRosa and Gilbert (2005). Policy makers 
should be interested – and, we conjecture, are interested – in ex post quantitative 
estimates of the effects of an EIA on trade flows (and, subsequently, on production, 
incomes, etc.). As John Whalley puts it in his article in this same collection of 
symposium papers: “A recent World Bank (Global Economic Prospects, 2005) estimate 
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is that perhaps around 43 percent of world trade was covered by agreements in force in 
2003 and was projected to increase to 55 percent by 2005 (OECD, 2003). But such 
calculations only raise more questions: How large are the impacts of these agreements on 
covered trade?” (italics added). 
  Surprisingly, estimates to date using the workhorse for ex post empirical analysis 
of the effect of EIAs on trade flows (the “gravity equation”) often find economically and 
statistically insignificant effects of EIAs on trade, cf., Frankel (1997). Moreover, recent 
empirical evidence shows that such estimates are quite fragile, cf., Ghosh and Yamarik 
(2004). We address estimation techniques that suggest that previous estimates are likely 
biased downward. Moreover, we provide empirical evidence of much more “sturdy” (ex 
post) estimates of the trade effects of EIAs. 
 Our fourth goal is then to address how the previous three issues help us to better 
understand the “latest wave” of regional trade agreements. We argue that policy makers 
have tended to expect larger trade effects from EIAs than ex ante CGE models have 
suggested. Because policy makers have selected endogenously into EIAs due the larger 
expected effects, previous ex post estimates of the trade effects of EIAs have been biased 
downward. Using our “sturdier” estimates of EIA “treatment effects,” we then confirm 
this conjecture, demonstrating much stronger EIA effects on trade than witnessed 
previously. 
Determinants of Bilateral Trade Flows and Bilateral Economic Integration Agreements 
 International economists such as Richard Baldwin (1995) and C. Fred Bergsten 
(1996) noted more than a decade ago that there were seemingly strong competitive 
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pressures in the world economy – sensed by nations’ governments – that induced such 
governments to liberalize trade both bilaterally and regionally. The large numbers of 
nations party to the GATT/WTO has grown over the past 50 years to approximately 150 
countries. This large number of parties has likely made the ability of negotiators to 
liberalize trade in agriculture, goods, services, capital, and labor under one agreement 
much more difficult6. Nevertheless, governments are pressured by individual voters and 
firms’ lobbies to provide a framework of policies (or “institutions”) well-suited to both 
constituencies’ interests (maximizing economic welfare and economic profits, 
respectively). In the face of these pressures and an impasse in multilateral trade and 
investment liberalization at the WTO level, governments have sought alternative policy 
changes to improve economic welfare and firms’ profits. One alternative – potentially a 
“building block” for further multilateral liberalization – is economic integration 
agreements (which include bilateral agreements). As shown in Figure 1, the proliferation 
of EIAs over the past fifty years has created the so called “spaghetti bowl” of EIAs. 
 However, Baldwin’s “domino theory” of regionalism and Bergsten’s “competitive 
liberalization hypothesis” are implicitly dynamic stories. In our view, before one can 
conceptualize about the “latest wave” of regionalism (which is also implicitly dynamic), 
we consider it imperative to address first “Regionalism.” That is, we start with a static 
long-run view of the determinants of regionalism (and bilateralism). The notion of 
“competitive liberalization” can be consistent with a static concept of regionalism as well 
                                                 
6
  See Mansfield and Reinhardt (2003) and Moravcsik (2005). Also, Moravcsik argues that competitive 
liberalization pressures have been the dominant force behind much of European economic integration, with 
the likely exception of Germany’s motivation in the 1950s. 
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as a dynamic one. As is traditional in economics, one should probably examine the long-
run economic factors influencing the equilibrium outcome before modeling explicitly the 
short- and medium-run factors influencing EIA formation, where the latter are often more 
easily observed and often discussed less technically.  We intentionally have used the term 
“Economic Integration Agreements” initially to be inclusive.  The term “Economic 
Integration” spans integration of goods, services, capital, and labor markets; in even 
broader views, it encompasses integration in economic activity that goes beyond 
economists’ traditional categorizations of “goods” and “factors.” We also used 
“Economic Integration” – not “Regional Economic Integration” – to be inclusive in 
geographic scope of coverage. Many recent economic integration agreements – the 
recently-signed Australian-U.S. FTA, for example – involve countries on different 
continents; economists have occasionally referred to these as “unnatural” EIAs, in the 
sense that they are not in the same geographic region or on the same continent.7 
However, the vast bulk of EIAs are regional free trade agreements, limited in scope to 
countries sharing common continents and to goods (and, in many cases, services) sectors. 
In the remainder of this paper, we will continue to use the acronym EIA to be inclusive of 
FTAs, customs unions, common markets, and economic unions, although most of the 
focus will be on the trade implications of EIAs. One reason for this is that, in the 
empirical analysis later, our EIAs will include some deeper integration agreements, such 
as the European Union. 
 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Krugman (1991a,b), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995, 1996), and Frankel (1997). 
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Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
 Before addressing directly static determinants of EIAs, it will be useful first to 
discuss the underlying economic context of world trade in the absence of policy-oriented 
barriers to trade. After we establish the fundamental determinants of trade and economic 
welfare in the presence of only “natural” barriers to trade (e.g., distance between 
economic agents), we then introduce (exogenously) policy oriented – or “artificial” – 
trade barriers. This will provide the background to then discuss endogenous regionalism 
behavior by governments.8 
 Because regionalism typically entails bilateralism,9 we address briefly 
determinants of bilateral trade flows in an N-country world (N>2) in the absence 
(presence) of policy-based (natural) trade barriers. The modern theory of international 
trade – largely developed in the context of two countries with production of goods in two 
industries using two factors of production – usually emphasizes that the economic 
rationales for international trade are traditional comparative advantage (or inter-industry 
trade, driven by Heckscher-Ohlin relative factor endowment differences or Ricardian 
relative productivity differences) and by “acquired” comparative advantage (or intra-
industry trade, due to increasing returns to scale in production of slightly differentiated 
products), but historically ignoring transport costs and economic geography. 
                                                 
8
 Our analysis initially will take as given exogenously the prevailing level of policy-oriented trade barriers, 
such as tariff rates. In reality, the ideal approach would be to consider the endogenously-determined Nash 
equilibrium tariff rates pre- and post-integration, as the pre-integration Nash equilibrium tariffs are likely to 
differ from the post-integration ones. Addressing this limitation, however, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
9
 In the remainder of the paper, we often use the terms “bilateralism” and “regionalism” interchangeably. 
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 However, motivated by the robust empirical regularity that bilateral trade flows 
between pairs of countries are explained well by the product of their gross domestic 
products (GDPs) and their bilateral distance, trade economists have formulated multi-
country (or N-country) theoretical foundations for a “gravity equation” of bilateral 
international trade over the past 25 years, and in a manner consistent with established 
theories of intra- and inter-industry international trade. For instance, the first formal 
theoretical foundation for the gravity equation with a one-sector endowment economy, 
but many countries, was Anderson (1979). Anderson showed that a simple (conditional) 
general equilibrium Armington model with products differentiated by country of origin 
and constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences yields a basic gravity equation:10 
ijijjiij DISTGDPGDPPX εβ βββ 3210 )()()(=       (1) 
where PXij is the value of the merchandise trade flow from exporter i to importer j, GDPi 
(GDPj) is the level of nominal gross domestic product in country i (j), DISTij is the 
distance between the economic centers of countries i and j, and εij is assumed to be a log-
normally distributed error term. The theory suggested that β1 = β2 = 1and β3 < 0. 
 Other papers extended these theoretical foundations in various important 
directions. Helpman and Krugman (1985) introduced monopolistic competition and 
increasing returns to scale, motivating a gravity equation with trade flows to explain 
intra-industry trade between countries with similar relative factor endowments and labor 
                                                 
10
 As noted in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), Anderson (1979) and Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003) are “conditional” general equilibrium models, employing a “trade separability” assumption where 
the allocation of bilateral flows across N countries is separable from production and consumption 
allocations within countries. 
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productivities. Bergstrand (1985) raised the issue of including multilateral price terms for 
importers and exporters as important for determining bilateral trade flows; for instance, 
the trade flow from i to j is influenced by the prices, transport costs, and other trade costs 
that the consumer in j faces from its N–2 other trade partners as well as domestic firms. 
Bergstrand (1989, 1990) showed formally that a gravity equation evolved from a 
traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model with two industries, two factors and N countries with 
both inter- and intra-industry trade. Evenett and Keller (2002) provided empirical 
evidence that a model with both Heckscher-Ohlin inter-industry trade and Helpman-
Krugman intra-industry trade with imperfect specialization fit the data best. Most 
recently, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have shown formally that proper estimation 
of the gravity equation (to avoid omitted variables bias) must recognize endogenous 
multilateral price terms for both the exporter and importer countries, and likely requires 
estimation of a system of nonlinear equations using custom nonlinear least squares 
programming to account properly for endogeneity of prices: 
PXij= β0(GDPi)1(GDPj)1(tij)1-σ Piσ-1 Pjσ-1εij       (2) 
where σ > 1, tij denotes bilateral trade costs (which potentially can be explained by 
various observable variables) and Pi and Pj are “endogenous” multilateral price terms that 
account for trade costs that agents in countries i and j face from all N countries (including 
at home), where  
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under an assumption that bilateral trade barriers tij and tji are symmetric for all pairs.  
Letting GDPT denote total income of all regions, which is constant across region pairs, 
then θi (θj) denotes GDPi /GDPT (GDPj/GDPT). Details of estimating (2) for aggregate 
trade flows using either nonlinear least squares or fixed effects for Pi and Pj are 
addressed in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Feenstra (2004), and Baier and 
Bergstrand (2002, 2006, 2007).11  Baier and Bergstrand (2002) extend the Anderson-van 
Wincoop one-sector, N-country endowment economy to a world with two sectors, two 
factors, and N countries with Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson inter-industry trade and 
Chamberlin-Helpman-Krugman intra-industry trade, cf., Carrere (2006).   
 Baier and Bergstrand (2006) show a method for estimating coefficient estimates 
in equations (2)-(4) using ordinary least squares (OLS) that are virtually identical to those 
estimated using Anderson and van Wincoop’s nonlinear least squares program or fixed 
effects, based upon a first-order Taylor series expansion of the theory: 
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11
 See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) for an excellent survey of the literature on theoretical 
foundations 
for the gravity model. In Anderson (1979), all prices were normalized to unity. In Bergstrand (1985, 1989, 
1990), a “small-country” assumption was employed to treat the other N-1 countries’ price levels as 
exogenous to the country pair ij. In Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) all countries’ price levels are 
endogenous. Also, see Evenett and Hutchinson (2002) for a volume of papers on gravity equation 
methodology. 
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 The gravity equation in specification (1) has been used traditionally for about 40 
years to explain the variation in bilateral trade flows among pairs of countries for a 
particular year and more recently for panel variation (especially, within variation using 
fixed effects, cf., Egger, 2000, 2002). Typically, several other binary variables are 
included to capture variation in various trade costs, such as an adjacency dummy and a 
language dummy. More relevant here, most researchers have included a dummy variable 
for the presence or absence of an EIA. As mentioned earlier, quantitative estimates of the 
coefficients of these EIA dummies have varied dramatically, cf., Frankel (1997), with 
some estimated average “treatment” effects seemingly small and others even negative. 
Estimates of gravity equation (2) for EIAs are scarce, since equation (2) surfaced in the 
past five years. Baier and Bergstrand (2002, 2007) provide some early estimates. 
Determinants of EIAs 
 A key notion in this paper is that is that bilateral EIAs are – like bilateral trade 
flows – endogenous and – under certain assumptions – may be considered to be 
determined in a competitive setting as well. In considering what factors might explain 
whether or not certain country pairs are likely or unlikely to have an EIA, one needs to 
distinguish along two dimensions. First, we address static versus dynamic determinants 
of EIAs. In the static view taken in this section, we consider a world in “long-run 
equilibrium.” We ask the question: what are some economic factors that explain 
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theoretically whether or not a pair of countries is likely to have an EIA (in equilibrium)?  
We then examine empirically using a cross-section qualitative-choice econometric model 
whether or not the pairs of countries that have EIAs are the most likely ones to have such 
agreements, conditioned upon a set of economic determinants suggested by theory 
(relative economic sizes, relative factor endowments, trade costs, etc.) and that full 
multilateral free trade liberalization under the WTO is prohibitively expensive.12 
 Second, we must distinguish between the “economics” of EIAs versus the 
“politics” (or political economy) of EIAs.13  In reality, of course, national governments 
are empowered to sign treaties regarding international commerce and factor mobility. In 
the international trade literature, it is common to assume that a representative (national) 
government’s objective is to maximize a weighted average of the welfare of individuals 
(in economic terms, voters’ utilities) and the influence of firms (in economic terms, 
firms’ economic “rents” or profits), which likely operate through lobbies.14  While both 
factors play a role in reality, we follow the intuitive suggestion by Bergsten (1996) that – 
in a long-run view – economic welfare is likely to be the dominant force, and that 
                                                 
12
 In our theory, we assume that the decision to have or not have an FTA takes as exogenous the current 
WTO structure that impedes achieving “free” trade. We assume, as Bergsten (1996) states, “It simply turns 
out to be less time-consuming and less complicated to work out mutually agreeable arrangements with a 
few neighbors than with the full membership of well over 100 countries in the WTO,” p. 4). This is also 
consistent with the approach taken in Grossman and Helpman (1995b) that, “As in Grossman and Helpman 
(1994a, 1995a), we suppose the incumbent government is in a position to set trade policy, which means 
here that it can either work toward a free trade agreement or terminate the discussions” (p. 670). A 
multilateral trade-policy alternative is ruled out by assumption. Also, since Bergsten wrote, there are now 
150 parties to the WTO. Zissimos (2006) demonstrates in a game-theoretic setting the 
relevance of geography (i.e., trade costs) for the formation of FTAs. 
13
 We borrow this useful distinction from Krugman (1991a). 
14
 See, for example, Grossman and Helpman (1995b) or Gawande, Sanguinetti, and Bohara (2005). and 
Carrere (2006)  
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political factors (lobbies, special interest groups, etc.) are likely to be relatively more 
important in the short- to medium-run.  Bergsten states:  
There are of course different national circumstances which explain 
the detailed strategies and timing of the individual initiatives. The 
overarching force, however, has been the process of competitive 
liberalization. The rapid increase of global interdependence has 
forced all countries, whatever their prior policies or philosophies, 
to liberalize their trade (and usually investment) regimes. 
Economic success in today's world requires countries to compete 
aggressively for the footloose international investment that goes far 
to determine the distribution of global production and thus jobs, 
profits and technology. (p. 2) 
 In our initial static analysis of selection into EIAs, we assume that the economic 
welfare of two nations’ representative consumers determines whether or not the 
governments of that pair choose to have an EIA or not. To avoid the role of economic 
rents (or excessive profits), we assume monopolistically competitive markets for the 
production of goods, with large numbers of profit-maximizing firms that find political 
coordination prohibitively costly; this simplifies the model.15  In a dynamic analysis that 
                                                 
15
 Even in a monopolistically competitive framework, countries might optimally choose higher tariffs in 
equilibrium. We assume they do not for three reasons: (1) the spirit of the GATT/WTO, where EIA 
members are precluded from raising their average external tariffs; (2) the Nash equilibrium may even yield 
a lowering of external tariffs (see work by Yi, 2000, and Ornelas, 2001); and (3) we have not observed 
increases in external tariffs (see empirical work by Estevadeordal, Freund and Ornelas, 2005). 
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addresses more the “timing” of formations of EIAs, political economy considerations and 
economic rents could surface. 
 Following in the spirit of Krugman (1991a,b), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996), and 
Frankel (1997), Baier and Bergstrand (2004) created a model of a world economy with 
asymmetric countries recognizing explicitly inter- and intra-continental trade costs. 
Krugman (1991a) used a simple model of three symmetric (or identical) economies 
where firms produced slightly differentiated goods under increasing returns to scale in 
production to show that – in a world with no trade costs – regional EIAs decreased 
economic welfare of households unambiguously. However, Krugman (1991b) showed 
that in the same model – but with prohibitive inter-continental trade costs – regional EIAs 
increased economic welfare unambiguously. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1996) cleverly 
labeled this the “Krugman vs. Krugman” debate.  Frankel, Stein, and Wei’s extension of 
Krugman’s model usefully allowed for a continuum of intercontinental trade costs, 
distinguishing “natural” EIAs (within continents) from “unnatural” EIAs (across 
continents). Frankel, Stein, and Wei could then show the cross-over point – in terms of 
inter-continental trade costs – at which on net welfare changed from positive to negative. 
Using some empirical estimates of the costs of inter-continental trade based upon a 
gravity model of trade, one conclusion from Frankel’s (1997) book was that – if all 
continents followed the European example – the regionalization of the world economy 
would be “excessive.” 
 In order to establish a quantitative model to predict which pairs of countries 
should or should not have an EIA, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) extended the Frankel-
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Stein-Wei model to allow for asymmetric economies – both in terms of economic size 
and in relative factor endowments – and for asymmetric inter- and intra-continental 
transport costs. The model has six countries on three continents with countries on the 
same continent facing (Samuelson) iceberg-type intra-continental trade costs and 
countries on different continents facing additional iceberg-type inter-continental trade 
costs. Each country is endowed with two factors of production, capital (K) and labor (L). 
There are two industries, goods and services, with preferences for the two sectors’ 
outputs of the Cobb-Douglas type. Preferences for each sector’s output are of the 
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) type, common to the trade literature. Each 
sector’s products are slightly differentiated, with each product produced under increasing 
returns to scale; consumers value variety. The production of goods and of services uses 
capital and labor in different relative factor intensities. Standard demand functions are 
generated, the details of which are discussed in Baier and Bergstrand (2004). 
 If governments are welfare maximizers, then – in the context of this model – 
certain economic characteristics are likely to favor EIAs’ formation in some pairs of 
countries relative to others.16 For example, two important economic factors influencing 
trade and utility are intracontinental and intercontinental trade costs. First, countries that 
are closer together (on the same continent) benefit more from an EIA because, with lower 
intra-continental trade costs, they are already large traders. Second, the net benefits of a 
                                                 
16
 Moreover, in the context of 20,000 potential bilateral interactions, each government is assumed to 
operate competitively taking as given the behavior of other governments (and welfare of their consumers). 
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natural EIA increase (and the net costs of an unnatural EIA decrease) as intercontinental 
trade costs rise, because more remote countries trade little with distant countries.   
 Baier and Bergstrand (2004) demonstrate also that pairs of larger GDP economies 
tend to benefit more from EIAs than pairs of smaller countries, due to economies of scale 
in production and increased varieties of products available. As two countries’ GDPs 
become more different, the likelihood of an EIA decreases. A larger economy’s benefit 
from an EIA diminishes as the two countries become more dissimilar in size (for a given 
total economic size) because the breadth of variety in imports from a small EIA partner 
contracts for the larger economy. 
 Due to the presence of two industries and two factors, the wider the relative factor 
endowments of a country pair, the more likely an EIA (if inter-continental transports are 
sufficiently high) due to the gains of exchange relative comparative advantages, i.e., 
inter-industry trade. However, the wider the difference in two partners’ relative factor 
endowments relative to the rest-of-the-world, the less likely an EIA. It is important to 
note – as perhaps surmised already – that most (if not all) of these economic factors are 
also well established as economic determinants of bilateral trade flows.  
  Based upon the qualitative-choice econometric model of McFadden, Baier and 
Bergstrand (2004) used a probit model to try to establish empirically the relative 
importance of these factors for explaining –and potentially predicting – the likelihood of 
an EIA between country pairs. We employed a sample of bilateral pairings among 54 
countries, or 1431 observations for EIAs observed in 1996 [(54x53)/2 =1431].  These 
probabilities are predicted using bilateral distances, GDP sizes, GDP similarities, relative 
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K/L ratios, and indexes of remoteness (or multilateral resistance) as explanatory 
variables, cf., Baier and Bergstrand (2004).   
 We draw attention to three empirical outcomes. First, the empirical probit model 
actually works quite well. As a measure of overall fit, the pseudo-R2 value of the full 
specification is 73 percent for 1431 country pairs. We note that for a (more recently 
constructed) wider sample of 96 countries in 1995, the pseudo-R2 remains high at 67 
percent. Of the 286 EIAs in 1996 in our original sample, the model predicted 85 percent 
(or 243) correctly. Of the remaining 1145 pairs with no EIAs, the model predicted 
correctly 97 percent (1114=1145-31). Details are available in Baier and Bergstrand 
(2004). We note that the most likely EIAs in 1996 (using exogenous geographic variables 
and GDPs and K/L ratios from 1960) were the earliest EIAs. 
 Second, of the top 200 pairs (of 1431) that were the most likely to have an EIA in 
1996, only six pairs did not have one: Iran-Iraq, Iran-Turkey, Chile-Peru (EIA being 
negotiated), Japan-South Korea (EIA being negotiated), Hong Kong-South Korea, and 
Panama-Venezuela.   
 Third, of the 1000 pairs (of 1431) that were the least likely to have an EIA in 
1996, only four pairs actually had an EIA: Portugal-Turkey, Egypt-Iraq, Mexico-Chile, 
and Mexico-Bolivia. 
Simultaneous Markets for Trade Flows and EIAs 
 Why does the model work so well? We believe the model is consistent with the 
notion of “competitive liberalization.” National governments realize countries are unique 
in economic characteristics. In the interest of liberalizing markets to improve productivity 
 67
levels and levels of living standards, national governments select into arrangements with 
other countries for which they share certain economic characteristics, such as similar 
economic size or close in distance. Empirically, most pairs of countries with EIAs tend to 
have the key economic characteristics that the theoretical model suggests should be 
present for an EIA to enhance (on net) the welfare of pairs’ representative consumers. In 
many (if not most) cases, these are pairings where countries already trade extensively 
with one another. This is consistent with Bergsten’s “competitive liberalization” notion 
that economic welfare may be the dominant long-run “overarching” force in driving 
regionalism, despite political factors influencing timing, etc.  Hence, the same observable 
variables that explain trade patterns – gravity-equation variables – also explain the 
likelihood of an EIA because of likely net benefits for producers and consumers from 
creating such an EIA. Hence, one can argue that ex post country pairs that have chosen to 
have EIAs have “chosen well.” 
 The reader might ask a seemingly obvious question: If national governments are 
simply maximizing consumers’ welfare, why not simply predict bilateral EIAs with 
bilateral trade flows? First, there is an “endogeneity” issue. Predicting the likelihood of 
an EIA based upon a probit regression using trade flows on the RHS will likely yield 
biased coefficient estimates. The reason is that “unobservable” variables – such as 
institutional and political factors – that likely influence the decision by governments to 
form EIAs also tend to influence trade flows. In cross-sectional data, these unobservable 
– to the econometrician – variables likely influence both EIA and trade variables. The 
coefficient estimates in the probit regression would be biased. Second, the probit 
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specification we use helps identify the “(exogenous) economic characteristics” that 
influence the decision to form an EIA: economic geography variables, factors influencing 
intra-industry trade, and factors influencing inter-industry trade.   
 The approach and results just discussed have some potentially important 
implications for the forty-five years of empirical research using the gravity equation with 
cross-sectional data discussed in section I.A. Since Nobel Laureate Jan Tinbergen (1962) 
first used the gravity equation, the equation has been used increasingly to estimate the 
impact of EIAs on members’ trade flows. Tinbergen (1962) studied bilateral international 
trade flows among several countries in a cross-section from the 1950s including dummy 
variables for the BENELUX FTA and the British Commonwealth members; he found 
that membership in either of these agreements increased trade by only 5 percent. 
However, the previous discussion suggests that cross-section estimates of EIAs’ effects 
on trade over these forty years suffer from potential selection bias. If country pairs select 
into EIAs for unobservable reasons correlated with potential trade flows, OLS estimates 
will likely be biased.17 
 To support our claim that estimates of the impact of EIAs may be biased, we 
provide in Table 1 coefficient estimates from a typical cross-section gravity equation for 
multiple years: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000. These coefficient estimates come from a 
typical log-linear version of equation (1) amended to include dummy variables for 
common land border (adjacency), common language, and common membership in 
                                                 
17
 A case where this is least likely to occur is the original EEC6 countries, formed based upon strong 
political and national security considerations. Consequently, plausible estimates of the trade effects of the 
EEC6 in Aitken (1973) may well be unbiased. 
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various EIAs, estimated using the (non-zero) nominal trade flows among the 96 countries 
identified in the Data Appendix. These estimates are derived including separate EIA 
dummy variables for the European Union (EU), the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), the European Economic Area (EEA), and all “other” EIAs (OEIAs). EUijt is 
defined to equal 1 if a country pair ij in year t were members of the European Economic 
Community (1960 to 1970), the European Community (1975 to 1990), or the European 
Union (1995 and 2000), and 0 otherwise. EFTAijt is defined to equal 1 if a country pair ij 
in year t were members of EFTA, and 0 otherwise. EEAijt is defined to equal 1 if one 
country was in EU and the other was in EFTA in year t; members of the EC (EU) formed 
(maintained) FTAs with remaining EFTA members in 1973 (1994). OEIAijt is defined as 
1 if country pair ij in year t had any other EIA agreement. 
 We describe briefly the data used for the gravity equations. Nominal bilateral 
trade flows are from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics for 
the years 1960, 1965, . . ., 2000 for 96 potential trading partners (zero trade flows are 
excluded); these data are scaled by exporter GDP deflators to generate real trade flows 
for the panel analysis. Nominal GDPs are from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (2003); these are scaled by GDP deflators to create real GDPs for the panel 
analysis. Bilateral distances were compiled using the CIA Factbook for longitudes and 
latitudes of economic centers to calculate the great circle distances. The language and 
adjacency dummy variables were compiled also from the CIA Factbook. The EIA 
dummy variables were calculated using appendices in Lawrence (1996) and Frankel 
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(1997), various websites, and EIAs notified to the GATT/WTO under GATT Articles 
XXIV or the Enabling Clause for developing economies; we included only full (no 14 
partial) EIAs. Table 3 lists the trade agreements used and sources.18  
 As Table 1 shows, common membership in EU had an economically significant 
effect in 1960 and 1970 only, with the sole statistically significant positive effect in 1960 
– only three years into the original EEC agreement. These results are surprising. Second, 
common membership in EFTA had an economically and statistically significant effect on 
trade in 1960 (the year the agreement came into effect!) and in 1970 only. In fact, 
common membership in EFTA had more than twice the effect on members’ trade than 
common membership in EU. These results are surprising. Third, common membership in 
any other EIA (OEIA) had a positive and economically significant effect in all five years 
examined, although the coefficient estimate is statistically different from zero in only 
three years of the sample (1960, 1980, 2000). Moreover, in 1970 the effect of other FTAs 
was to increase trade by 1900 percent. Consequently, the results for OEIA are quite 
fragile. All in all, the empirical results using a typical gravity equation specification – 
assuming the EIA variables are exogenous – are not very supportive that EIAs actually 
work.   
 As discussed earlier, typical gravity equation (1) is likely misspecified owing to 
ignoring theoretical foundations that have developed over the past several decades. Table 
2 provides estimates of theoretically motivated gravity equation (2) using (as is now 
common) country-specific fixed effects to account for the variation of multilateral price 
                                                 
18
 The data set is available at the authors’ websites (http://www.nd.edu/~jbergstr and 
http://people.clemson.edu/~sbaier). 
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terms Pi and Pj in equation (2) and restricting the coefficient estimates for GDPs to be 
unity (as suggested by theory). As Table 2 reports, accounting for the theoretically-
motivated multilateral price terms does improve the results for EIA effects relative to 
Table 1. If anything, estimates from the theoretically-motivated gravity equation (2) 
using country fixed effects lend even less support to the notion that ex post EIAs actually 
work.19 
 The reason why the EIA variables’ coefficient estimates may be biased is perhaps 
due to the endogenous determination of EIAs in a competitive environment. For instance, 
in equations (1) or (2), the error term ε may be representing unobservable (to the 
empirical researcher) policy-related barriers tending to reduce trade between countries i 
and j that are not accounted for by standard gravity equation RHS variables, but may be 
correlated with the decision to form an EIA. Suppose two countries have extensive 
immeasurable domestic regulations (say, internal shipping regulations) that inhibit trade 
(causing ε to be negative). The likelihood of the two countries’ governments selecting 
into an EIA may be high if there is a large expected welfare gain from potential bilateral 
trade creation if the EIA deepens liberalization beyond tariff barriers into domestic 
regulations (and other non-tariff barriers). Thus, EUijt and the intensity of domestic 
regulations may be positively correlated in a cross-section of data, but the gravity 
equation error term εijt and the intensity of domestic regulations may be negatively 
                                                 
19
 It should be remembered throughout that the discussion of “effects” of an EIA are limited only to the 
primary “direct” effect associated with the dummy variable’s coefficient estimates, and we are intentionally 
precluding from our discussion the full general-equilibrium comparative-static effects addressed in 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2006). 
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correlated.  This suggests that EUijt and εijt are negatively correlated, and the EU 
coefficient estimate may be underestimated. 
 Numerous authors have noted that one of the major benefits of regionalism is the 
potential for “deeper integration.” Lawrence (1996, p. xvii) distinguishes between 
“international policies” that deal with border barriers, such as tariffs, and “domestic 
policies” that are concerned with everything “behind the nation’s borders, such as 
competition and antitrust rules, corporate governance, product standards, worker safety, 
regulation and supervision of financial institutions, environmental protection, tax codes 
...” and other national issues. The GATT and WTO have been remarkably effective in the 
post-WWII era reducing border barriers such as tariffs. However, these institutions have 
been much less effective in liberalizing the domestic policies just named. As Lawrence 
states it, “Once tariffs are removed, complex problems remain because of differing 
regulatory policies among nations” (p. 7). He argues that in many cases, EIA “agreements 
are also meant to achieve deeper integration of international competition and investment” 
(p. 7). Gilpin (2000) echoes this argument: “Yet, the inability to agree on international 
rules or to increase international cooperation in this area has contributed to the 
development of both managed trade and regional arrangements” (p. 108; italics added). 
 We believe this omitted variable (selection) bias is the major source of 
endogeneity facing estimation of EIA effects in gravity equations using cross-section 
data. Moreover, the arguments above suggest that policymakers’ decisions to select into 
an EIA are likely related to the level of trade (relative to its potential level), and not to 
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recent changes in trade levels. Thus, the determinants of EU, EFTA, EEA, and OEIA are 
likely to be cross-sectional in nature. 
Estimating the Effects of Various EIAs on Trade Flows using Panel Data 
 With cross-section data, standard econometric techniques to address omitted 
variables (and selection) bias include estimation using instrumental variables and 
Heckman control functions. Only a small handful of studies in the past three years have 
attempted to do this; Baier and Bergstrand (2002) was the first.  Of the few studies that 
have attempted to solve this dilemma using instrumental variables and other cross-section 
techniques, there has been little success, cf., Baier and Bergstrand (2007). The reason 
basically is that – in cross-section – it is virtually impossible in a convincing way to 
identify variables that are correlated with the EIA dummy variable and are uncorrelated 
with trade flows. Baier and Bergstrand (2002) explored myriad possible trade-related 
instrumental variables (specifically, they tried capital-labor ratios, factor endowment 
differences relative to the rest of the world, and remoteness of continental FTA partners), 
concluding that none of the instruments can be shown to be sufficiently exogenous for 
two reasons.  First, the multi-step estimation procedure detailed by Wooldridge (2002, ch. 
18) and Baier and Bergstrand (2002) precludes a test of the over-identifying restrictions 
that establish, empirically, that the instruments are truly “exogenous.” Second, the 
instruments that have been conceived of have also been used in gravity equation 
estimates, and estimates of their effects are often statistically significant; this indicates 
that they likely are correlated with the error term in our theoretically-motivated gravity 
equation.   Baier and Bergstrand (2002) also report trying many political variables as 
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instruments, but the same drawbacks exist for them as for the trade-related variables.  
Thus, there appear to be no observable variables to identify the respective equations.   
 However, some alternative techniques are available to address the problem. For 
example, if the decisions to form EIAs are “slow-moving” – as they are likely to be – but 
trade flows are not slow moving (also likely), then panel data offers an opportunity to 
better identify unbiased effects of EIAs on trade flows. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
pursued this using first-differences and Cheng and Wall (2005) using fixed effects, but 
both in the context of atheoretical gravity specifications with small samples. 
 Baier and Bergstrand (2007) used both approaches in the context of a 
theoretically-motivated gravity equation for a broad sample of countries and panel data. 
Starting from the conditional general equilibrium of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) motivated the panel version of the Anderson and van 
Wincoop gravity equation: 
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where Xijt is the real (inflation-adjusted) trade flow from i to j in year t and RGDPit is real 
GDP of country i in year t and EIA is used generically to represent the set of EU, EFTA, 
EEA, and OEIA. 
 Using fixed effects, Baier and Bergstrand (2007) find that the cumulative average 
treatment effect of an EIA on trade after 10-15 years is 0.76. Given that e0.76 equals 
2.14, this implies that an EIA on average increases two member’s international trade by 
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114 percent after 10-15 years. This estimated effect is both considerably larger and more 
robust to sensitivity analyses than earlier estimates.   
 In this paper, we examine in particular the effects of EU membership, EFTA 
membership, EEA membership, and membership in all other EIAs using these 
techniques. Thus, in contrast to Baier and Bergstrand (2007) which treated the effects of 
all EIAs the same, this paper applies the ex post techniques of Baier and Bergstrand 
(2007) to examine some specific agreements, allowing here for changing membership 
over the forty year period from 1960-2000. We have two paper goals in mind for the 
remainder of this analysis. First, we want to try to estimate with precision (and 
robustness) the ex post effects of various Western European trade agreements on 
members’ international trade, accounting for the endogeneity of trade agreements’ 
formation. Second, we want to establish that the economic effects of trade agreements on 
members’ trade were much larger than previous estimates have suggested, which will 
help to explain the proliferation of trade agreements in later years. 
Alternative Panel Estimation Techniques: Fixed versus Random effects 
 Our panel estimation applies fixed effects rather than random effects for two 
reasons, the first on conceptual grounds and the second on empirical grounds. First, as 
addressed in section 2, we believe the source of endogeneity bias in the gravity equation 
is unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity. In economic terms, we believe there are 
unobserved time-invariant bilateral variables – termed wij – influencing simultaneously 
the presence of an EIA and the volume of trade. Because these variables are likely 
correlated with EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij they are best controlled for using 
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bilateral “fixed effects,” as this approach allows for arbitrary correlations of wij with 
these variables. By contrast, under “random effects” one assumes zero correlation 
between unobservables wij with EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij, which seems less 
plausible. 
 Second, recent econometric evaluations of the gravity equation with panel data 
have used the Hausman Test to test for fixed versus random effects. For example, Egger 
(2000) finds overwhelming evidence for the rejection of a random-effects gravity model 
relative to a fixed-effects gravity model, using either bilateral-pair or country-specific 
fixed effects. 
Fixed Effects versus First Differencing 
 A standard discussion on the treatment of endogeneity bias using panel data focus 
on a choice between estimation using fixed effects versus using first-differenced data, cf., 
Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 10).  Wooldridge notes that when the number of time periods (T) 
exceeds two, a fixed-effects estimator is more efficient under the assumption of serially 
uncorrelated error terms. When T > 2 and the error term εijt follows a random walk (i.e., 
that the difference in the error terms, εijt-εij,t-1, is white noise), the first differencing 
estimator is more efficient.20 
 It is possible that first-differencing the panel data yields some potential 
advantages over fixed effects. First, it is quite plausible that the unobserved heterogeneity 
in trade flows, εijt, is correlated over time. Following the points in section II, unobserved 
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 When the number of time periods is limited to two (T=2), estimation with fixed effects and first 
differencing produce identical estimates and inferences; moreover, first-differencing is easier. When T>2, 
the choice depends upon the assumption the researcher makes about the error term εijt. 
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factors influencing the likelihood of an EIA (say, trade below its “natural” level) are 
likely slow moving and hence serially correlated. If the εijt are highly serially correlated, 
the inefficiency of fixed effects is exacerbated as T gets large. This suggests that 
differencing the data will increase estimation efficiency for our large-T panel. Second, 
aggregate trade flow data and real GDP data are likely “close to” unit-root processes. 
Using fixed effects is equivalent to differencing data around the mean (in our sample, 
1980); this may create a problem since T is large in our panel. As Wooldridge (2000, p. 
447) notes, if the data follow unit-root processes and T is large, the “spurious regression 
problem” can arise in a panel using fixed effects.  First-differencing yields data that 
deviates from the previous period of our panel, and thus is closer to a unit-root process.  
In the following, we use fixed effects in sections 3.3 and 3.4, and for robustness we use 
differenced data in section 3.5. 
Fixed-Effects Estimation of an Atheoretical Gravity Equation Ignoring Multilateral Price 
Terms 
 In a panel context, equation (1) can be expressed as: 
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Table 4 provides the empirical results of estimating gravity equation (7) using a panel of 
real trade flows (Xijt), real GDPs (RGDPit, RGDPjt) and EIA dummies (EUij, EFTAij, 
EEAij, and OEIAij), and using alternative specifications with and without bilateral fixed 
effects and time dummies. Column (1) provides the baseline gravity equation without any 
fixed effects or time dummies for all nine years. Exporter and importer (real) GDPs have 
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coefficients close to unity, distance has a traditional coefficient estimate of -1, and the 
adjacency and language dummies have typical coefficient estimates.   
 However, other than OEIAij the coefficient estimates for the Western European 
EIAs are quite unstable across agreements, suggesting fragile estimates. Although EFTAij 
has an economically and statistically significant value of 0.33 (suggesting that EFTA 
increased trade by e0.33 = 39 percent), membership in various stages of the EEC/EC/EU 
had a statistically significant negative effect on members’ trade, as did the EEA’s EU-
EFTA free trade agreements. Such results seem implausible.   
 Column (2) provides the empirical results including a time dummy, where (for 
brevity) we omit reporting the (statistically significant) coefficient estimates for these 
time dummies.  Although the inclusion of the time dummies causes the RGDP elasticities 
to move closer to unity, the coefficient estimates for the time-invariant variables 
(distance, adjacency, and language) are unaffected. However, coefficient estimates for 
EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij are all affected. Now, even the coefficient estimate for 
EFTAij is surprisingly negative and statistically insignificant. Moreover, the OEIAij 
coefficient estimate becomes very large, 1.12, implying that non-Western European EIAs 
on average increase trade by 200 percent. This result also seems implausible. However, 
time dummies do not adjust for the endogeneity of EIAs. 
 Adjusting for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity using bilateral fixed effects 
has a notable impact on the results. Column (3) provides results including bilateral fixed 
effects. The coefficient estimates for EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij now are all 
plausible and are statistically significant. It is worth noting now that the coefficient 
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estimates for EUij, EFTAij, and OEIAij are also all virtually identical quantitatively 
(0.58, 0.55, and 0.57, respectively), each implying that the particular agreement increases 
trade about 75 percent. Membership in EEAij increases bilateral trade about 40 percent.21  
 Column (4) in Table 4 combines the inclusion of bilateral fixed effects and time 
dummies. One notable change occurred in the coefficient estimates for EUij, EFTAij, 
EEAij, and OEIAij for this specification relative to the previous one. First, the coefficient 
estimate for EUij increases substantively, suggesting that membership in the EU increased 
trade of the typical country pair during the period by 144 percent. A second more minor 
difference is that the coefficient estimate for EEAij increased while those 
for EFTAij and OEIAij stayed approximately the same.   
 Column (5)’s specification differs from column (4)’s only by restricting the 
coefficient estimates for the (time-varying) real GDP variables to be unity. This reduces 
the overall explanatory power (Within R2), but has only minor implications for the EUij, 
EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij coefficient estimates. 
 Overall, the inclusion of bilateral fixed effects and time-varying dummies has 
made the coefficient estimates for EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij more economically 
plausible and statistically significant. If (as we will argue shortly) the effects of an EIA 
on trade took 15 years to play themselves out, the coefficient estimates from column (5) 
                                                 
21
 The only other published studies that have estimated the ATE of an EIA using a panel of data spanning 
as many years and countries are Rose (2004) and Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2004). Using fixed effects, 
Rose found an ATE of e0.94 or 156 percent. However, using a classification of formal and informal GATT 
members, Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2004) estimate an ATE for EIAs (with fixed effects) of only e0.76 
or 114 percent. Cheng and Wall (2002) used bilateral fixed effects in a four-year panel of trade among 
approximately only 30 high-income countries in the context of a traditional gravity equation ignoring 
multilateral price terms. 
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imply that common membership in the EU (beginning with the original six EEC 
countries) increased trade (in real terms) about 5.6 percent annually over 15 years. 
Common membership in EFTA (or the EC-EFTA trade pacts) increased trade about 3.5 
percent annually and membership in any other EIA increased trade about 4.3 percent 
annually. 
 How do these results compare to previous ones? Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1997) examined the impacts of common membership in the original EEC6 and in the 
original EFTA7, but only over a much shorter period, 1956-1973. They found implied 
annualized impacts of only 3.2 and 2.3 percent, respectively, over the period. These are 
significantly lower than our estimates of 5.6 and 3.5 percent annually, respectively, over 
1960-2000. By contrast, our estimate for OEIAij membership was 0.63, which is 
considerably lower than comparable estimates using similar specifications in Rose (2004) 
and Tomz, Goldstein, and Rivers (2007) of 0.94 and 0.76, respectively.   
 However, we emphasize that all these estimates used an “atheoretical” 
specification for the gravity equation. If we account for recent theoretical advances in 
foundations for the gravity equation, slightly different specifications from those above 
surface. The specifications above suffer ex ante from ignoring time-varying multilateral 
price terms, as suggested by recent theoretical developments. In the next section, we 
account for such terms, as well as the potential influence of “phasing-in” agreements. 
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Fixed-Effects Estimation of a Theoretically-Motivated Gravity Equation with Phased-In 
Agreements 
 In this section, we consider three modifications to the previous specification. In 
section 3.4.1, we include country-and-time effects to account for the theoretically-
motivated multilateral price terms. In section 3.4.2, we account for the fact that all EIAs 
are “phased-in” over time, typically over five-to-ten years, and for the possibility that the 
change in two members’ terms of trade from formation of an EIA may have a lagged 
impact on their bilateral trade. In section 3.4.3, we address “strict exogeneity” issues; we 
test for the possibility of reverse causality by addressing the effect of future EIA 
dummies on current trade flows. 
Accounting for Multilateral Price Terms 
 While the results in the previous section are encouraging, the gravity equation 
suggested by recent formal theoretical developments – summarized in the system of 
equations (2)-(4) in section 1 –suggests that one needs to account for the multilateral 
price variables. None of the four specifications in Table 4 accounts for these. First, 
accounting for the multilateral price variables in a panel context suggests estimating: 
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As before, scaling the LHS variable by the product of real GDPs suggests estimating: 
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 In a panel setting, the multilateral price variables would be time varying, and 
consequently the results in specifications (1)-(5) in Table 4 may suffer from an omitted 
variables bias as a result of ignoring these time-varying terms – a dilemma that cannot be 
resolved by the use of bilateral fixed effects and time dummies using the panel data in its 
current form.22 Moreover, the theoretical model in equation (2) suggests that the 
coefficient estimates for the real GDP variables should be unity, as reported in 
specification (5) in Table 4. 
 We first estimate equation (8) using bilateral (ij) fixed effects to account for 
variation in DIST, ADJ, and LANG along with country-and-time (it, jt) effects to account 
for variation in real GDPs and the multilateral price terms. In the context of the theory 
(though ignoring the restriction of unitary income elasticities), this should generate an 
unbiased estimate of β6. 
 Column (1) in Table 5 provides the results of estimating this equation using 
bilateral fixed effects and the country-and-time effects. We note two observations. First, 
all the coefficient estimates for the effects of EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij on trade are 
diminished (relative to those in Table 4) by accounting for the theoretically-motivated 
multilateral price terms. Second, there is a notable change in the relative effects of the 
agreements. Common membership in the European Union (or, as appropriate in 
early years, EEC or EC) declines only slightly. Membership in the EU still increased 
trade by almost 100 percent. Membership in any other EIA increased trade by almost 60 
                                                 
22
 Random effects estimation would not be of any use either, as theory suggests that the multilateral price 
terms and the EIA variable would be correlated. 
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percent. However, membership in EFTA had no effect. The EC-EFTA free trade 
agreements that began in 1973, and continued in the 1994 EEA agreement, boosted trade 
by about 20 percent, considerably less than in Table 4's results. 
 Column (2) of Table 5 imposes explicitly unitary elasticities for real GDPs. 
However, in the presence of the it and jt dummies, this restriction is redundant, except for 
influencing the intercept estimate. Scaling or not scaling real trade flows by real GDPs 
will not matter for estimating the ATE in this specification. In log-linear form, the 
variation in the logs of real GDPs is captured by the country-and-time (it, jt) effects, and 
only the estimates of the intercept and the country-and-time effects’ coefficients change; 
the EIA coefficient estimate is unaffected. In the remainder of the results, we use the 
real trade flow for the LHS variable; the EIA coefficient estimates are identical using 
trade shares instead (and are available on request). 
Accounting for “Phased-In” Agreements and Lagged Terms-of-Trade Effects 
 In this section, we introduce lagged effects of EIAs on trade. The economic 
motivation for including lagged changes stems partly from the institutional nature of 
virtually all EIAs. The 0-1 EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij variables were constructed 
using the “Date of Entry into Force” of the agreement, as best surmised by scrutinizing 
multiple data sources provided earlier. However, virtually every EIA is “phased-in,” 
typically over 10 years. For instance, the original EEC agreement of 1958 had a 10-year 
phase-in period; NAFTA had a similar 10-year provision. Thus, the entire economic 
(treatment) effect cannot be captured fully in the concurrent year only. It is reasonable to 
expect an EIA entered into “legally” in 1990 to not come into economic effect fully until 
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2000. Thus, it is reasonable to include one or two lagged levels of the EIA dummy (e.g., 
EUij,t-1 and/or EUij,t-2).   
 Moreover, economic effects of an EIA include altering the terms of trade. 
However, as is well known from a large literature in international economics, terms-of-
trade changes tend to have lagged effects on trade volumes. Thus, it is reasonable to 
assume that an EIA which enters into force in 1960, and which is even fully “phased-in” 
by 1965, might still have an effect on trade flows in 1970.  
 The results in columns (3) and (4) in Table 5 reveal that EUij has a statistically 
significant lagged effect on trade flows. Moreover, the coefficient estimates have 
economically plausible values, balanced across periods. In column (3), the sum of the two 
ATEs for EUij is 0.82 – identical in magnitude to the EUij coefficient estimate in column 
(5) of Table 4. With two lags, the coefficient estimate for one of the two lagged terms is 
statistically insignificant; however, summing the coefficient estimates yields a total ATE 
of 0.90. Since this ATE reflects the effect of EU membership over approximately 15 
years, the implied average annual effect on members’ trade across the 15-year transition 
period is 6.2 percent. This is only slightly larger than our earlier estimate (using the 
atheoretical gravity equation), and is roughly twice the average annual ATE found in 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen for the original EEC6 countries.   
 We will discuss the results and implications for all other EIAs (OEIAijt) in a later 
section. 
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Strict Exogeneity 
 The results of previous sections suggest that – after accounting for endogeneity 
using panel data – one can find economically significant ATEs for EIA. However, to 
confirm that there are no “feedback effects” from trade changes to EIA changes, we run 
one more specification using the fixed-effects approach.23 Wooldridge (2002, p. 285) 
suggests that it is easy to test for the “strict exogeneity” of EIAs in our context. To do 
this, we add future levels of EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij to the regression model. 
In the panel context here, if EUij, EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij changes are strictly 
exogenous to trade flow changes, EUij,t+1, EFTAij,t+1, EEAij,t+1, and OEIAij,t+1 
should be uncorrelated with the concurrent trade flow.  The results in column (5) of Table 
5 confirm this. In only case did EUij,t+1, EFTAij,t+1, EEAij,t+1, and OEIAij,t+1 affect 
the trade flow Xijt materially; except for EEAij,t+1, in all cases the coefficient estimate is 
not significantly different from zero. Moreover, the consistently negative coefficient 
estimates suggest – if anything – that firms delay trade temporarily in anticipation of an 
impending agreement. 
First-Differenced Panel Gravity Equation Estimates 
 As discussed in section 3.2, for two econometric reasons we may expect first-
differenced data to provide better estimates of the average treatment effect than using 
“fixed effects.” At worst, differenced data provide an evaluation of the robustness of 
previous estimates. In the context of differenced panel data, the potential omitted 
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 An empirical finding that trade leads an EIA need not even imply that trade “causes” an EIA. Trade may 
increase in anticipation of an EIA as infrastructure and delivery systems involving sunk costs are 
redirected, cf., McLaren (1997). Alternatively, trade may decrease – be delayed – in anticipation of the 
benefits of an EIA. 
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variables bias created by time-varying multilateral price terms for each country would 
require again country-and-time effects to obtain consistent estimates of the EIAs’ ATEs. 
As before, with country-and-time effects the coefficient estimates of the EIA treatment 
effects are insensitive to the real bilateral trade flow being scaled or not scaled by real 
GDPs; for consistency to earlier results, we present those for the flows (the virtually 
identical results are available on request using trade flows scaled by the product of real 
GDPs). We start by first-differencing the natural logarithm of Xijt, creating dlnXij,t-(t-1). 
Second, we regress dlnXij,t-(t-1) on 768 country-and-time effects (Dumi,t-(t-1), where i 
denotes a country and t-(t-1) a 5-year period, e.g., 1995-2000) and retain the residuals. 
Third, we difference EUijt, creating dEUij,t-(t-1), and regress dEUij,t-(t-1) on the same 
768 country-and-time fixed effects and retain these residuals (and do the same for 
EFTAij, EEAij, and OEIAij). Fourth, a regression of the residuals from the first (dlnX) 
regression on the residuals from the other regressions will yield unbiased estimates of the 
ATE effect of an EIA holding constant time-varying multilateral price terms.   
 The procedure described above is equivalent to estimating: 
)1(,)1(,)1(,)1(,)1(,)1(,6)1(,ln −−−−−−−−−−−−−− +++= ttijttjttjttittittijttij vDumDumdEIAXd βββ  (10) 
where dEIA represents any of the four trade agreements we have been investigating and 
νij,t-(t-1) = εij - εij,t-1 is white noise. With nine years in the panel, we have 8 time periods t-(t-
1). Since there are 96 countries that can potentially trade, our procedure above effectively 
introduces 768 (= 8 x 96) country-and-time fixed effects (Dumi,t-(t-1) and Dumj,t-(t-1)) to 
account for the changes in the unobservable theoretical multilateral resistance terms,  
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)1(,ln ttjPd , to obtain an unbiased estimate of β6. In the context of the 
theoretical model, the 768 estimates of βi,t-(t-1) and βj,t-(t-1) can be interpreted as changes in 
the countries’ multilateral resistance terms. 
 Table 6 reports the coefficient estimates for the effects of concurrent, lagged and 
future changes in four agreements on trade flow changes. For the European Union, 
columns (1)-(4) all report slightly smaller coefficient estimates for the EU effect than the 
respective estimates in Table 5 using fixed effects.  For EFTA, the results are more 
plausible. However, as in Table 5, the effects of EFTA are quite small.  Using first 
differences, the effects of EC-EFTA free trade agreements are small as well, but largely 
similar to those in Table 5. As with the EU, the effects for all other EIAs are diminished 
using first differences relative to fixed effects.   
 The major point worth noting from an empirical standpoint is that the results 
using first differencing provide strong support for the robustness of the previous 
estimates in this section using fixed effects for the theoretically-motivated gravity 
equation. Membership in the EEC/EC/EU had an economically and statistically 
significant effect on trade among members between 1960 and 2000. This result is robust 
across many specifications. The small variation in results, say, between column (2) in 
Table 5 and Table 6 – total ATEs of 0.82 and 0.70, respectively (depending upon one’s 
preferences over underlying assumptions about the error structure) – suggest that these 
results are fairly precise and robust.  In average annual percent changes, the two effects 
are 5.6 and 4.8 percent, respectively, over a 15 year period. For all other EIAs, the results 
for the two approaches (using column (2) results again) are 0.77 and 0.59. 
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Implications for Understanding the “Latest Wave” of Regionalism 
 What do these empirical results mean for better understanding the “latest wave” 
of regional trade and cooperation agreements? National policy makers around the world 
operating in an increasingly competitive global environment face strong pressure from 
their national constituents (firms, households) to maximize their economic status (profits 
and consumer welfare, respectively). Such policy makers are likely making decisions 
about trade policies in a competitive environment. The proliferation of bilateral and 
regional EIAs in the world economy likely mirrors the proliferation of bilateral and 
regional trade in the world economy. There is a world market for goods and services is 
met efficiently by bilateral trade flows. Correspondingly, there has likely emerged a 
world “market” for bilateral and regional trade policies/institutions to facilitate the 
bilateral exchange of products, owing largely to the gains from specialization and the 
welfare benefits of product diversity for final goods producers (i.e., product 
differentiation in intermediates) and consumers (i.e., product differentiation in final 
goods). 
 The vast bulk of EIAs are among countries: (1) that are close in distance and 
consequently share low bilateral transaction costs; (2) that are large in economic size and 
consequently benefit from greater specialization in production and variety in terms of 
consumption; (3) that differ in relative factor endowments, benefitting from the exchange 
of traditional comparative advantages. Our probit estimates of the determinants of EIAs 
confirmed this. Hence, the vast bulk of EIAs are among countries that trade extensively; 
that is, countries that have formed EIAs have chosen well.   
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 Traditional ex ante estimates of the trade and economic welfare gains from EIAs 
have often suggested relatively modest economic benefits. Much anecdotal evidence 
from policy makers suggests that the anticipated economic gains are much larger that 
traditional CGE models have implied. However, sufficient time has now passed – and 
econometric and theoretical developments advanced – such that policy makers can now 
examine with more precision the ex post effects of EIAs on trade patterns. The evidence 
in this paper suggests that the trade effects of membership in the EEC/EC/EU have been 
much larger than those suggested by ex ante considerations and much larger than even 
earlier empirical estimates using cross-sectional gravity equations suggested, cf., Frankel 
(1997). The results here suggest that EEC/EC/EU membership over the past forty years 
(1960-2000) is of an economically significant magnitude even larger than that postulated 
a decade ago in Bayoumi and Eichengreen’s excellent analysis of early EEC6 effects 
between 1957-1972. 
 Policy makers around the world have likely drawn lessons from the apparent 
success of the major economic integration agreement experiment of 1957, the Treaty of 
Rome. They have likely pursued the seeming trade enhancements for bilateral and 
regional EIAs. And the evidence in this paper suggests that their “economic 
expectations” have largely been correct. Our results suggest that Other EIAs that have 
formed over the 1960-2000 period have also yield “average treatment effects” of nearly 
the same magnitudes as the trade effects of the EEC/EC/EU members. Naturally, the 
deeper integration of the EU has likely boosted the trade effects of that particular 
agreement relative to most other agreements, which have been FTAs. 
 90
 Our overall message is twofold. First, ex post empirical evidence suggests that 
policy makers are likely operating in a competitive environment, pursuing economic 
integration agreements in “natural cases” where the members already trade extensively 
(based upon bilateral, multilateral, and world levels of GDPs and trade costs). Second, 
after accounting for the pitfalls associated with the “endogeneity of EIAs’ 
determination,” the vast bulk of EIAs have tended to augment members’ trade by about 
100 percent over a 15-year period. This is consistent with anecdotal evidence from policy 
makers that the economic benefits from EIAs are much larger than conventional ex ante 
economic analyses have previously suggested. 
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Table 3.1: Typical cross-section gravity equation coefficient estimates. 
Variable   (1) 1960  (2) 1970   (3) 1980  (4) 1990  (5) 2000 
ln GDPi 0.76 (46.57)  0.89 (57.77)  1.01 (69.37)  1.09 (85.00)  1.19 (103.97) 
ln GDPj  0.76 (49.65)  0.92 (64.17)  1.01 (73.56)  0.97 (77.96  0.98 (87.36 
ln DISTij  -0.65 (-16.81)  -0.84 (-20.95)  -1.06 (-27.65)  -1.07 (-28.68)  -1.20 (-33.00) 
ADJij  0.14 (0.93)  0.13 (0.78)  0.35 (2.24)  0.58 (3.65)  0.67 (6.90) 
LANGij   0.05 (0.54)  0.27 (2.75)  0.55 (5.83)  0.79 (8.07)  0.65 (6.90) 
EUij  0.67 (2.00)  0.48 (1.16)  -0.36 (-1.32)  -0.25 (-1.15)  -0.29 (-1.76) 
EFTAij   0.56 (2.41)  1.04 (4.25)  0.32 (0.91  -0.19 (0.41)  -0.98 (-0.71) 
EEAij   -0.07 (-0.31)  -0.15 (-0.71)  -0.11 (-0.29) 
OEIAij  0.72 (1.77)  3.01 (0.38)  0.86 (1.81)  0.61 (1.42)  0.61 (5.05) 
Constant  -10.17  
(-21.63) 
 -14.36  
(-30.74) 
 -17.16  
(-37.62) 
 -18.34  
(-43.34) 
 -19.72  
(-51.56) 
RMSE  1.4144  1.7548  1.8935  1.9919  1.9616 
R2  0.6035  0.6364  0.6453  0.6651  0.7147 
Obs.  2789  4030  5494  6474  7302 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) nominal 
bilateral trade flow from i to j. 
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Table 3.2: Theory-motivated cross-section gravity equations with country fixed effects 
Variable   (1) 1960  (2) 1970   (3) 1980  (4) 1990  (5) 2000 
ln GDPi   0.76 (46.57)  0.89 (57.77)  1.01 (69.37)  1.09 (85.00)  1.19 (103.97) 
ln GDPj   0.76 (49.65)  0.92 (64.17)  1.01 (73.56)  0.97 (77.96)  0.98 (87.36) 
ln DISTij   -0.65 (-16.81)  -0.84 (-20.95)  -1.06 (-27.65)  -1.07 (-28.68)  -1.20 (-33.00) 
ADJij   0.14 (0.93)  0.13 (0.78)  0.35 (2.24)  0.58 (3.65)  0.67 (6.90) 
LANGij   0.05 (0.54)  0.27 (2.75)  0.55 (5.83)  0.79 (8.07)  0.65 (6.90) 
EUij   0.67 (2.00)  0.48 (1.16)  -0.36 (-1.32)  -0.25 (-1.15)  -0.29 (-1.76) 
EFTAij   0.56 (2.41)  1.04 (4.25)  0.32 (0.91)  -0.19 (0.41)  -0.98 (-0.71) 
EEAij     -0.07 (-0.31)  -0.15 (-0.71)  -0.11 (-0.29) 
OEIAij   0.72 (1.77)  3.01 (0.38)  0.86 (1.81)  0.61 (1.42)  0.61 (5.05) 
Constant   -10.17              
(-21.63) 
 -14.36            
(-30.74) 
 -17.16            
(-37.62) 
 -18.34             
(-43.34) 
 -19.72            
(-51.56) 
RMSE   1.4144   1.7548  1.8935  1.9919  1.9616 
R2   0.6035  0.6364  0.6453  0.6651  0.7147 
Obs.   2789  4030  5494  6474  7302 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) nominal 
bilateral trade flow from country i to country j divided by the product of their nominal 
GDPs. Coefficient estimates of country fixed effects are not reported for brevity. 
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Table 3.3: Economic integration agreements 
European Union, or EU (1958): Belgium–Luxembourg, France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Denmark 
(1973), Ireland (1973), United Kingdom (1973), Greece (1981), Portugal (1986), Spain (1986), Austria 
(1995), Finland (1995), Sweden (1995) 
The Customs Union of West African States (1959): Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal 
European Free Trade Association, or EFTA (1960): Austria (until 1995), Denmark (until 1973), Finland 
(1986–1995), Norway, Portugal (until 1986), Sweden (until 1995), Switzerland, United Kingdom (until 
1973) 
Latin American Free Trade Agreement/Latin American Integration Agreement, or LAFTA/LAIA (1961–
1979,1993–): Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
(became inoperative during 1980–1990, but reinitiated in 1993) 
African Common Market (1963): Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco 
Central American Common Market (1961–1975, 1993–present): El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Costa Rica (1965) 
Economic Customs Union of the Central African States (1966): Cameroon, Congo, Gabon 
Carribean Community, or CARICOM (1968): Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana (1995) 
EU–EFTA Agreement/European Economic Area (1973/1994) 
Australia–New Zealand Closer Economic Relations (1983) 
US–Israel (1985) 
US–Canada (1989) 
EFTA–Israel (1993) 
Central Europe Free Trade Agreement, or CEFTA (1993): Hungary, Poland, Romania (1997), Bulgaria 
(1998) 
EFTA–Bulgaria (1993) 
EFTA–Hungary (1993) 
EFTA–Poland (1993) 
EFTA–Romania (1993) 
EU–Hungary (1994) 
EU–Poland (1994) 
North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA (1994): Canada, Mexico, United States 
Bolivia–Mexico (1995) 
Costa Rica–Mexico (1995) 
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EU–Bulgaria (1995) 
EU–Romania (1995) 
Group of Three (1995): Columbia, Mexico, Venezuela 
Mercado Comun del Sur, or Mercosur (1991): Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay (formed in 1991 and a 
free trade area in 1995) 
Andean Community (1993): Bolivia, Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, Peru (1997) 
Mercosur–Chile (1996) 
Mercosur–Bolivia (1996) 
Canada–Chile (1997) 
Canada–Israel (1997) 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN (1998): Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
(effective on 80% of merchandise trade in 1998) 
CARICOM–Dominican Republic (1998) 
Hungary–Turkey (1998) 
Hungary–Israel (1998) 
India–Sri Lanka (1998) 
Israel–Turkey (1998) 
Mexico–Nicaragua (1998) 
Romania–Turkey (1998) 
Poland–Israel (1998) 
Romania–Turkey (1998) 
Mexico–Chile (1999) 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (2000): Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Sudan, Zimbabwe, Zambia 
EU–Israel Agreement (2000) 
EU–Mexico (2000) 
Poland–Turkey (2000) 
Mexico–Guatemala (2000) 
Mexico–Honduras (2000) 
Mexico–Israel (2000) 
Mexico–El Salvador (2000) 
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New Zealand–Singapore (2000) 
 
Countries listed in agreements only include those in our sample of 96 countries listed in 
the Data Appendix. Agreements are listed in chronological order of date of entry into 
force. Years in parentheses denote date of entry, except where noted otherwise. 
Sources: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_esummary_e.xls. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/europe_agr.htm. 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/union.htm. 
http://www.nafinsa.com/finsafreetrade.htm. 
http://www.sice.oas.org/default.asp. 
Frankel, Jeffrey A. Regional trading blocs. Institute for International Economics (1997). 
Lawrence, Robert Z. Regionalism, multilateralism, and deeper integration. The 
Brookings Institution (1996). 
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Table 3.4: Panel gravity equations in levels using various specifications 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
ln RGDPit  .95 (217.57)  0.98 (231.55)  0.71 (34.52)  1.27 (47.29)  
ln RGDPjt  .95 (225.07)  0.97 (236.17)  0.58 (26.53)  1.23 (41.72)  
ln DISTij  -1.04 (-78.42)  -1.02 (-78.34)    
ADJij  0.38 (7.66)  0.34 (6.56)    
LANGij  .60 (18.06)  0.53 (16.25)    
EUijt  -0.25 (-7.16)  -0.11 (-2.77)  0.58 (7.57)  0.89 (11.58)  0.82 (10.65) 
EFTAijt  0.33 (7.36)  -0.17 (-3.49)  0.55 (4.23)  0.45 (3.48)  0.50 (3.88) 
EEAijt  -0.12 (-2.83)  -0.11 (-2.53)  0.34 (3.92)  0.57 (6.64)  0.53 (6.24) 
OEIAijt  0.72 (10.24)  1.12 (16.07)  0.57 (8.86)  0.65 (10.25)  0.63 (9.92) 
RMSE  1.9252  1.8567    
Overall R2  0.6582  0.6821    
Within R2      0.2038  0.2273  0.088 
Obs.  47081  47081  47081  47081  47081 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real 
bilateral trade flow from country i to country j. Coefficient estimates of various 
fixed/time effects are not reported for brevity. 
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Table 3.5: Panel gravity equations with bilateral fixed and country-and-time effects 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
EUijt  0.65** (7.86)  0.45** (4.01)  0.47**(3.90)  0.50**(3.74) 
EUijt-1   0.37** (3.13)  0.19 (1.36)  0.04 (0.29) 
EUijt-2    0.24* (1.78)  0.26 (1.57) 
EUijt+1    -0.08 (-0.63) 
EFTAijt  -0.01 (-0.09)  -0.18 (-1.10)  -0.12 (-0.61)  0.04 (0.16) 
EFTAijt-1   0.29* (1.83)  0.13 (0.60)  0.17 (0.74) 
EFTAijt-2    0.07 (0.41)  -0.05 (-0.28) 
EFTAijt+1     -0.22 (-1.02) 
EEAijt  0.19* (2.11)  0.05 (0.48)  0.10 (0.85)  0.19 (1.61) 
EEAijt-1   0.29** (2.85)  0.09 (0.76)  0.06 (0.47) 
EEAijt-2    0.27** (2.51)  0.13 (1.00) 
EEAijt+1    -0.24* (-1.66) 
OEIAijt  0.46** (7.02)  0.31** (4.55)  0.29** (4.10)  0.39** (3.64) 
OEIAijt-1   0.46** (4.77)  0.37** (3.52)  0.29* (1.79) 
OEIAijt-2    0.17 (1.26)  0.11 (0.67) 
OEIAijt+1    -0.04 (-0.58) 
Constant  8.43 
 (279.58) 
 8.92 
 (346.63) 
 9.00  
(263.34) 
 9.16 
 (282.92) 
Within R2  0.3106  0.3050  0.2759  0.2523 
Obs.  47081   36563  34105  27575 
Wald stat 
[EU] 
 83.19** 52.00** 17.20** 
Wald stat 
[EFTA] 
 0.63 0.19 0.05 
Wald stat 
[EEA] 
 11.80** 12.12** 0.47 
Wald stat 
[OEIA} 
 65.88** 29.65** 14.37** 
t-statistics are in parentheses. *(**) denotes statistical significance at 5 (1) percent level 
in one-tailed t-test. 
The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real bilateral trade flow.  Coefficient 
estimates for bilateral fixed and country-and-time effects are not reported for brevity. 
 103
Table 3.6: Panel gravity equations with bilateral fixed and country-and-time effects with 
GDP restrictions 
Variable  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)  
EUijt   0.65**(7.85) 0.45**(4.01) 0.46**(3.84) 0.50**(3.67) 
EUijt-1  0.37**(3.12) 0.19 (1.39) 0.05 (0.31) 
EUijt-2    0.24 (1.78) 0.26 (.157) 
EUijt+1    -0.08 (-0.60) 
EFTAijt  -0.01 (-0.11) -0.18 (-1.08) -0.12 (-0.60) 0.04 (0.18) 
EFTAijt-1   0.29 (1.79) 0.13 (0.60) 0.05 (0.31) 
EFTAijt-2    0.67 (0.38) -0.06 (-0.32) 
EFTAijt+1    -0.22 (-1.03) 
EEAijt   0.19* (2.10) 0.05 (0.48) 0.08 (0.73) 0.17 (1.47) 
EEAijt-1  0.29**(2.84) 0.10 (0.82) 0.07 (0.52) 
EEAijt-2    0.27* (2.47) 0.13 (0.98) 
EEAijt+1    -0.23 (-1.62) 
OEIAijt   0.46**(7.01) 0.30** (4.55) 0.29**(4.08) 0.39**(3.61) 
OEIAijt-1  0.46** (4.77) 0.37**(3.52) 0.29 (1.79) 
OEIAijt-2   0.17 (1.26) 0.11 (0.67) 
OEIAijt+1    -0.04 (-0.57) 
Constant   -25.05** 
(-870.87) 
-25.16** 
(-911.73) 
-25.39** 
(-742.83) 
-25.32** 
(-782.33) 
Within R2  0.1896 0.1824 0.1626 0.1575 
Obs. 47081 36563 34105 27575 
Wald stat 
[EU] 
 83.12** 51.55** 17.14** 
Wald stat 
[EFTA] 
 0.61 0.18 0.06 
Wald stat 
[EEA] 
 11.74** 11.51** 0.43 
Wald stat 
[OEIA} 
 65.91** 29.60** 14.29** 
t-statistics are in parentheses. *(**) denotes statistical significance at 5 (1) percent level 
in one-tailed t-test.  
The dependent is the (natural log of the) real bilateral trade flow divided by the product 
of the real GDPs. Coefficient estimates for bilateral fixed and country-and-time effects 
are not reported for brevity. 
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Table 3.7: First-differenced panel gravity equations with country-and-time effects 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
EUij,t-(t-1)  0.48** (8.91)  0.47** (8.63)  0.46** (8.54)  0.46** (8.16) 
EUij(t-1)-(t-2)   0.23** (4.41)  0.19** (3.70)  0.04 (0.72) 
EUij(t-2) -(t-3)    -0.11** (-2.82)  -0.07 (-1.17) 
EUij(t+1) -t    0.06 (0.82) 
EFTAij,t-(t-1)  0.08 (1.28)  0.02 (0.27)  0.01 (0.85)  0.03 (0.40) 
EFTAij(t-1) -(t-2)   0.20** (3.09)  0.14* (2.06)  0.23** (2.74) 
EFTAij(t-2) -(t-3)    0.02 (0.23)  -0.01 (-0.13) 
EFTAij(t+1) -t    -0.25* (-2.25) 
EEAij,t-(t-1)  0.19** (4.02)  0.17** (3.49)  0.16** (3.43)  0.15** (2.92) 
EEAij,(t-1) -(t-2)   0.06 (1.40)  0.05 (1.08)  0.05 (1.00) 
EEAij(t-2) -(t-3)    -0.02 (-0.40)  -0.01 (0.09) 
EEAij(t+1) -t    -0.20** (-2.59) 
OEIAij,t-(t-1)  0.31** (6.66)  0.30** (6.30)  0.28** (6.04)  0.27** (4.55) 
OEIAij(t-1) -(t-2)   0.29** (4.57)  0.25** (3.79)  0.30 (1.72) 
OEIAij(t-2) -(t-3)    0.05 (0.29)  0.04 (0.21) 
OEIAij(t+1) –t    -0.06 (0.91) 
Constant  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00)  0.00 (0.00) 
R2  0.0009  0.0011  0.0011  0.0010 
Obs.  36563  34105  31172  24642 
t-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the (natural log of the) real 
bilateral trade flow from country i to country j.*(**) denotes statistical significance at 5 
(1) percent level in one-tailed t-test.  Coefficient estimates for bilateral fixed and country-
and-time effects are not reported for brevity. 
 105
Figure 3.1: Mapping of bilateral free trade agreements (the “spaghetti bowl”) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
TRADE FLOW CONSEQUENCES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S 
REGIONALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 Groups of countries sometimes impose regulations on themselves.  The nature of 
these regulations ranges from military policy, such as nuclear proliferation restrictions, to 
trade policy, such as limitations on tariffs due to World Trade Organization membership.  
One specific form of group regulation is regional environmental regulation: a group of 
countries in a region imposes environmental regulations on all members of the group.  
Regional environmental regulation has occurred inside common markets, such as the 
European Union, and other economic integration agreements (EIAs), such as the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation treaty that was designed to 
accompany the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)24,25.  In this paper, I 
show that the consequences of increasing environmental regulation stringency differs 
across low income and high income member countries of the European Union.  I model 
and demonstrate empirically the possibility for high income members of a region to 
benefit from environmental regulations imposed on the entire group as a protectionist 
measure – that is, as a means of deterring industry from relocating to the lower income 
                                                 
24
 The EU has passed, beginning in 1980, a series of specific directives with stated limits on, for example, 
sulfur dioxide concentrations in ambient air.   
25
 The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation does not create new environmental 
standards or limits on pollutions.  Rather, it is designed to encourage enforcement of existing 
environmental standards within NAFTA member countries. 
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countries to take advantage of the lower production costs offered there and of 
simultaneously increasing sales of exports of domestic producers.   
 This paper exploits survey data from the World Economic Forum in which 
business executives rate environmental regulation stringency in various countries.  Using 
these data in a gravity equation context, I test the effect of an increase in environmental 
regulation stringency on bilateral trade flows from all countries (in the dataset) to all 
countries, from high income countries to high income countries, from high income 
countries to low income countries, from low income countries to high income countries, 
from low income countries to low income countries, and from low income countries to all 
countries.  I control for whether an increase in environmental regulation stringency 
occurred within a European Union member country, allowing estimation of the effects of 
environmental regulation inside and outside a region.   
Background 
 Many economists have investigated the relation between international trade flows 
and environmental regulations.  Some research on this subject has tested whether a 
country can increase its ability to export by reducing the stringency of environmental 
regulations and therefore lowering the costs of production for exporters (Ederington and 
Minier, 2003; Levinson and Taylor, 2004; Ederington et al., 2005).  Also, the pollution 
haven hypothesis (PHH) states that “dirty” industries will relocate to those countries that 
lower their environmental standards, further increasing those countries’ exports (Mani 
and Wheeler, 1999; Levinson and Taylor, 2004).  The combination of lowered costs for 
domestic exporters and the relocation of dirty industries from countries with stringent 
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environmental regulations to pollution havens theoretically leads to predictions of 
increased exports when a country lowers its environmental regulation stringency.  
Empirically, however, the effects of changes in environmental regulation stringency have 
not been clear.  Those studies that have found support for the PHH have generally been 
limited to studies of the United States and some of its trade partners or studies of only 
European countries.   
 For over forty years, international trade economists have empirically tested the 
effects of changes in determinants of trade patterns by using the gravity equation, 
explained further in Section 4 of this paper.  Until recently, most gravity equation 
estimates had not found empirical evidence to support that a decrease in environmental 
regulation stringency leads to an increase in exports (Harris et al., 2002).  Furthermore, 
early gravity equation estimates of the effect of environmental regulations on trade flows 
rely on proxies for environmental regulation stringency that likely introduced 
endogeneity to the estimates (Jug and Mirza, 2005).  In Appendix A, I explicitly show 
how environmental outcome variables introduce endogeneity into gravity equation 
estimates of the effects of environmental regulation stringency on trade flows.  In 
addition, I introduce a new proxy for environmental regulation stringency – survey data – 
and show that it might not introduce endogeneity in Appendix B. 
 More recent gravity equation estimates that appropriately accounted for 
unobservable country characteristics that could affect both the choice of environmental 
regulation stringency and the level of economic activity has found statistically significant, 
positive effect of lowering environmental regulation stringency on exports (Jug and 
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Mirza, 2005).  Jug and Mirza run instrumental variables estimations of gravity equation 
estimates of the effect of environmental regulation compliance expenditure and obtain 
results that are similar to a non-gravity equation study (Ederington and Minier, 2003) that 
had been conducted using United States data.  Both studies’ results obtain a significant 
positive effect on exports when environmental regulation stringency is relaxed.  I 
improve on these studies in multiple ways.  The first is by using a proxy for 
environmental regulation stringency – survey data from the World Economic Forum – 
that is less likely to introduce endogeneity.  Using this proxy also allows me to include 
many more non-European and low income countries in my dataset than most previous 
studies.  The second is by using gravity equation estimation techniques developed by 
Baier and Bergstrand that allow the inclusion of an economic integration agreement 
variable in the gravity equation without biasing estimates (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004).  
The third is by controlling for the possible interaction between European Union 
membership and environmental regulations.  Regulations imposed by the EU on the 
entire group might have different effects than unilaterally generated regulations.  Finally, 
I estimate the effects of changes in environmental regulation stringency on trade flows 
for countries of different income levels, because the effects may drastically differ for high 
income countries and low income countries. 
Unilateral versus Regional Environmental Regulations 
 When an increase in environmental regulation stringency occurs unilaterally due 
to changes within the country (e.g. pressure from constituents for a cleaner environment), 
the effect on exports from that country to other countries could be positive or negative.  
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Technology spillovers, other countries’ taste for “green” goods, establishment and 
protection of property rights, and signaling of governmental stability could all contribute 
to a positive effect on exports from a country due to a unilateral increase in 
environmental regulations in the low income country.  Porter and Van der Linde (1995) 
argue that stringent environmental regulations can benefit a country not only through 
improved environmental quality but also through the development of comparative 
advantages in highly-regulated industries.   
 Conversely, the increased cost of production due to the increase in regulations 
could contribute to a negative effect on exports because of the resultant higher price of 
domestically produced goods relative to foreign goods.  This could be exacerbated if 
some “dirty” industries choose to relocate because of the increased cost of production.  
The net effect of a unilateral increase in environmental regulation stringency therefore 
seems to be an empirical question. 
 When an increase in environmental regulation stringency occurs due to changes 
beyond an individual country’s control (e.g. the European Union imposes environmental 
standards on all members), it is possible that any possible positive effect on exports from 
that country due to the change would be diminished while the negative effect would be 
simultaneously magnified.  Any positive effect resulting from establishment and 
protection of property rights and signaling of governmental stability might disappear 
because the regulations are not self-imposed; externally generated regulations do not 
necessarily signal stability or protection of property rights: people do not believe that a 
power-hungry dictator has truly eschewed the development of nuclear weapons when 
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threats of UN sanctions and even war have forced the dictator to stop nuclear weapon 
development in his country.  The cost of production might increase even more than in the 
case of self-imposed regulations if generalized environmental standards applied across a 
group of countries ignore differences in individual country characteristics, such as 
variance in the sulfur content of coal and oil across countries; these characteristics are 
less likely to be ignored by policymakers in each individual country, and the lowest-cost 
type of regulation (that achieves the same outcome standard) could be chosen on a 
tailored basis in the case of a unilateral environmental regulation increase (Oates and 
Schwab, 1996).   
 One largely unexplored area in the empirical international trade literature is the 
interaction of economic integration agreements (EIAs), such as the European Union and 
NAFTA, and environmental regulations.  I show, in a model in Section 3 and empirically 
in section 5, that the (possibly unintended) consequences of regional environmental 
regulations that could differ across income levels of countries.  Low income countries in 
an EIA could be more adversely affected by an increase in production costs caused by 
environmental regulations than high income countries for two possible reasons.  The first 
I term the uneven competitiveness effect, and it is a reframing of the Alchian-Allen 
hypothesis (Alchian and Allen, 1964).  The second reason I term the uneven burden of 
compliance: because high income countries are more likely than low income countries to 
have relatively stringent environmental regulations in place prior to the creation of 
regional environmental regulations, the cost of compliance with a given regional 
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environmental regulation might be lower for high income countries than for low income 
countries.  The remainder of section 2 briefly explains these two effects. 
Uneven Competitiveness Effect 
 The Alchian-Allen hypothesis is that the presence of a per unit transport cost 
lowers the relative price of high quality goods compared to low quality goods.  For 
example, transportation costs cause firms to export high quality apples while keeping low 
quality apples for domestic consumption, a phenomenon that Alchian and Allen refer to 
as “shipping the good apples out.”  I reframe the Alchian-Allen hypothesis to examine an 
increase in production cost due to an increase in environmental regulation stringency.  
This is explained briefly here and shown more explicitly in a model in Section 3.   
 If production costs in all countries in a region increase by some constant k as a 
result of regional environmental regulations, the percent increase in price will be higher 
for countries that produce low priced goods than countries that produce high priced 
goods.  If there are other producers outside the region whose costs are not increased by k, 
then the impact on each country’s competitiveness (relative to the rest of the world) 
caused by the increase in price falls more heavily on the low income countries inside the 
group than the high income countries.26  In other words, there is an uneven effect on 
country competitiveness across income groups. 
Uneven Burden of Compliance 
                                                 
26
 I employ the term, “competitiveness,” to mean a country’s ability to export goods – an increase in price 
of a country’s goods, due to an increase in production costs, means that the country cannot export as many 
goods because of substitution and income effects on the parts of foreign consumers. 
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 The second reason that low income countries could be more adversely affected 
than high income countries due to an increase in regional environmental regulation 
stringency is that the costs of compliance with the regulation may not be equally 
distributed among all countries.  High income countries typically have more stringent 
environmental regulations in place than low income countries prior to the passage of any 
regional environmental regulations27.  Compliance with regional environmental 
regulations would be less costly in those high income countries than in low income 
countries, if all countries have to meet some constant standard of compliance.  Thus, the 
increase in production costs would be higher in low income countries than in high income 
countries: the uneven burden of compliance.  The uneven burden of compliance is 
modeled in Section 3.  
Model 
Consumption 
 Each of N different countries produces a single product, whose exogenous quality 
is differentiated from the products of other countries.28  The representative consumer in 
country j maximizes his CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) utility function: 
( ) ρρµ
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1
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ijij xxU  
Subject to a budget constraint: 
                                                 
27
 As evidence that high income countries typically have more stringent environmental regulations than low 
income countries, note that the mean rating of the environmental regulation stringency of the high income 
countries in the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for years 2000 – 2005 is 5.77 on 
a scale of 1 to 7 where 7 is “very stringent” and 1 is “very lax”, while that of low income countries over the 
same period is 3.46. 
28
 Instead of a single product, it could be that each country produces a variety of products. This variety 
could even be endogenized, following Dixit-Stiglitz, but that complication seems unnecessary here. 
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Where Mj is country j’s income (real GDP), pij is the price of country i’s good when it is 
sold in country j, xij is the quantity of good produced in country i that gets consumed in 
country j, µi is the quality of country i’s good, and ρ (0 < ρ < 1) is a preference parameter 
capturing the substitutability between goods: as ρ approaches 1, the goods are nearly 
perfect substitutes, and as ρ approaches 0, the goods are more complimentary. The FOC 
of this constrained optimization’s LaGrangian is given by: 
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Dividing the FOC for good i by that of good 1 yields: 
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Solving for xij: 
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Let σ denote the elasticity of substitution, i.e. σ = 1 / (1 - ρ) and 1 < σ < ∞: 
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Multiplying both sides by pij and summing over i to produce country j’s income on the 
LHS, we find: 
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Solving this expression for xij yields: 
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The denominator of this demand is a quality-adjusted price index for country j, which I 
will refer to as Ij. This Marshallian Demand immediately implies the total expenditure of 
those in country j on the goods from country i is given by: 
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Because of transport costs and tariffs, the price of an imported good is more expensive 
than the same good in its home country. I model this accordingly: 
{ }EIA
ijiij eDpp
1ψδ −
=  
Where pi is the price of the good in its home country, Dij is the distance between country i 
and country j, and 1{EIA} equals 1 iff i and j are members of an EIA (Economic 
Integration Agreement).  I assume that a good’s quality is increasing in the GDP of the 
country where it is produced: 
ακµ ii M=  
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Substituting these two expressions into the expenditure shares produces the gravity 
equation, where κ and α are simply parameters:29 
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Production 
 The representative producer in each country is a monopolistically competitive 
firm with a constant marginal cost that varies across countries, ci.  I assume ci is 
increasing in µ.   The producer’s objective is to maximize profits: 
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I assume that the country is a price index taker. The FOC governs the country’s optimal 
pricing policy: 
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Making the optimal price a simple mark-up over marginal cost: 
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This yields a simple expression for the country’s income: 
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Effects of Environmental Regulatory Compliance 
                                                 
29
 By allowing these parameters to vary depending on whether we are considering trade between rich and 
poor countries or rich to rich, this model becomes more flexible and implicitly makes these parameters a 
function of what determines rich and poor. 
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 I investigate the possible effects of changes in environmental regulation 
stringency by examining comparative statics in a partial equilibrium – one without 
income effects – and then discuss the potential role of those income effects.  
  I model environmental regulation as an exogenous change that benefits the 
representative consumer’s utility at the expense of higher marginal cost in production. 
The benefits are assumed to be accrued in a linearly separable portion of the utility 
function, which implies that only the costs (and not the benefits) alter the behavior of 
agents in our existing model.  
 Substituting (3.4) into (3.1), we reach a reduced form Marginal Rate of 
Substitution (MRS) for consumers in country j considering imports from country i and 
country k. To examine the substitution effect of environmental regulations, consider the 
reduced MRS both before and after an increase in environmental regulation stringency 
(t=0 and t=1, respectively): 
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Where r is the increase in marginal cost due to regulation, t is both a superscript and 
dummy variable indicating pre- and post-regulation periods, and two different countries 
selling goods in country j are indexed by i and k.  I compare the pre- and post-regulation 
MRS to find the condition under which the MRS has decreased as a result of the 
environmental regulations: 
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Performing some basic algebra yields 
 ikki rcrc >  (3.6) 
which holds when ci > ck and rk ≥ ri.  When the marginal cost of production is higher in 
country i than in country k, or when the cost of compliance is greater in country k than in 
country i, the effect of an increase in regional environmental regulation stringency is to 
decrease the MRS.   The aforementioned Alchian-Allen hypothesis is a special case of 
this condition, where the costs of compliance are equal for both countries: rk = ri.  
 There is good reason to suspect that this condition holds for the EU.  High income 
member nations typically produce more expensive (and higher quality) products than low 
income member nations and most nations seeking to join (e.g., financial services 
produced in London versus textiles in Turkey, an EU candidate state).  Likewise, the high 
income member nations on average have stricter environmental regulations than low 
income member nations and most nations seeking to join.  Consequentially, we would 
expect that regulatory cost of low income members or candidate members would be 
greater than high income member nations.  If this condition does indeed hold, then:  
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(3.7) 
Hence, ex post exports from country k to country j are smaller than ex ante, relative to the 
exports of country i.  The partial equilibrium effect of the regulation is to cause 
consumers to substitute away from less costly goods to more expensive goods because 
the costs of the regulation somewhat equilibrates the marginal costs of those goods.  
 119
 The partial equilibrium results indicate that richer countries grab a larger market 
share when environmental regulations are increased. However, this can be (somewhat) 
counteracted by a general equilibrium effect: the size of the overall market is decreased 
by the income effect of the environmental regulation. In contrast, expanding an EIA 
lowers tariffs, producing a wealth effect in the opposite direction. Hence, if an increase in 
environmental regulations is accompanied by a sufficient expansion in EIAs, then the 
market can grow and rich countries can increase their market share. Thus, the presumed 
exogeneity of environmental regulations is drawn into question because the unintended 
consequences of that regulation may disproportionally benefit particular agents. 
 Following Maloney and McCormick (1982), we could model firms in country i 
lobbying for environmental regulations because their profits vary with environmental 
regulation. If regulations were determined by a vote of industry representatives, then the 
median-cost country could effectively choose its first-best alternative. The situation is 
more interesting when environmental regulations, once passed, are irreversible (i.e. 
environmental regulations can only be tightened, not slackened). In this case, existing EU 
members could extract (nearly) all of the gains from integration simply by increasing 
environmental regulations up until a participation constraint for countries seeking 
membership.  This particular idea is left for future research. 
Econometric Issues with the Gravity Equation 
 The literature on the effects of environmental regulations on trade flows has 
suffered from the lack of a standard measure of environmental regulation stringency.  
Previous gravity equation estimates of the effect of environmental regulation stringency 
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on trade flows have relied on outcome measures, such as energy intensity, carbon 
emissions, and sulfur emissions; as these studies admit, endogeneity is an issue when 
using these outcome variables as proxies for environmental regulation stringency.  I 
explicitly show the potential endogeneity of such an outcome variable in Appendix A.  
 Instead of an outcome variable, I use the results of the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report survey, which asks thousands of executives from around 
the world to rate each country’s environmental regulation stringency (Porter et al., 2001-
2006).  This survey asks executives to rate overall environmental regulation stringency in 
each country, compared to all other countries.  The rating scale is from one to seven, 
where one is “lax compared with most other countries” and seven is “among the world’s 
most stringent.” I show in Appendix B that endogeneity is possibly avoided by using 
survey data as a proxy for environmental regulation stringency.   
 As the topic of regional environmental regulation necessarily requires a regional 
agreement that imposes the regulation on a group of countries, I first discuss the pitfalls 
of including an economic integration agreement (EIA) variable in the gravity equation.  
Specifically, I address the endogeneity inherent in the selection into EIAs and how other 
authors have dealt with that problem. 
Endogeneity in the gravity equation 
 A typical gravity equation that includes a variable for economic integration 
agreements is 
 ijt
EAL
ijjtitijt
ijtijij eeeDYYPX εβ ββββββ 6543210=  (4.1) 
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where PXij is the value of the merchandise trade flow from exporter i to importer j, Yi is 
the level of gross domestic product in country i, Dij is the great circle distance between 
the economic centers of countries i and j, Lij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i 
and j share a common language, equal to 0 otherwise, Aij is a dummy variable for 
adjacency that is equal to 1 if countries i and j share a common land border, equal to 0 
otherwise, Eijt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j are both in economic 
integration agreement (EIA), and εijt is assumed to be a log-normally distributed error 
term.  In log form, equation (4.1) becomes 
 ijtijtijijijjtitijt EALDYYPX εβββββββ lnlnlnlnlnln 6543210 +++++++=  (4.2) 
 Early versions of the gravity equation applied to international trade flows did not 
have formal theoretical foundations (for examples, see Tinbergen (1962), Linnemann 
(1966), Aitken (1973) and Sapir (1981)); instead, these earlier studies relied either on 
informal economic foundations or to a physical science analogy. Since 1979, however, 
formal theoretical economic foundations for a gravity equation similar to equation 1 have 
surfaced, such as Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Deardorff (1998), Baier and 
Bergstrand (2001), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).  
All of these models include an explicit role for prices across countries in order to 
generate unbiased estimates.  Anderson and van Wincoop specifically include 
multilateral (price) resistance terms for each country in their system of equations, and 
solve their system using a custom nonlinear least squares program.  Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003) and Feenstra (2004, Ch. 5) both suggest using country-specific fixed 
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effects as an alternative method for accounting for multilateral price terms that will also 
generate unbiased coefficient estimates.   
 Extending this literature are Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007).  Baier and Bergstrand (2004) shows that gravity equation estimates of 
the trade flow effects of free trade agreements that include bilateral pair fixed effects are 
both plausible and consistent across various econometric specifications.  Baier and 
Bergstrand (2007) contains a formal demonstration that bilateral pair fixed effects and 
time dummies specifications of the gravity equation yield the same results as the method 
of generating custom nonlinear least squares programs employed by Anderson and van 
Wincoop. 
Endogeneity in the Economic Integration Agreement variable 
 An endogeniety bias arises when RHS variables are correlated with the error term.  
In equation (4.2), the economic integration agreement (EIA) variable, Eijt, could 
potentially be correlated with the error term, rendering estimates of the effect of EIAs 
therefore biased; empirically and theoretically, the determinants of whether a bilateral 
pair chooses to join an EIA tend to be the same factors that explain large trade flows: size 
and similarities of countries’ GDPs, distance between the two countries and distance to 
the rest of the world, whether they share a common language, and differences in relative 
factor endowments with respect to each other and the rest of the world (Baier and 
Bergstrand, 2004).  The error term could capture unobservable policy-related barriers, 
such as intra-country shipping regulations, in one or both countries that affect trade 
between the two and are not accounted for in a typical gravity model.  Joining an EIA 
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might entail not just the liberalization of tariffs barriers and other border costs but also 
that of internal, unobservable non-tariff barriers.  Furthermore, it seems likely that 
country pairs that have already harmonized many non-tariff barriers could easily choose 
to adopt an EIA because the costs of implementing it are relatively low.  Failure to 
econometrically account for this would introduce an underestimation of the effect of 
joining an EIA due to a selection bias (Baier and Bergstrand, 2006).  In the case of the 
European Union, a specific EIA where economic integration of monetary policies, 
antitrust policies, environmental regulations, and securities regulations is a stated goal, 
the liberalization of non-tariff barriers clearly poses an important potential welfare gain 
for EU members. 
This paper appears to be the first to include bilateral-pair fixed effects in gravity 
equation estimates of the effects of environmental regulation stringency on trade flows.  
Baier and Bergstrand (2007) showed that OLS with bilateral-pair fixed effect terms can 
correct the omitted variable bias on the EIA variable.  Yet, to date, no authors of gravity 
equation-type estimates of the effects of environmental regulation stringency on trade 
flows have dealt with the potential endogeneity arising from the inclusion of an EIA 
variable in the gravity equation.  Further, following Egger (2000), time dummies are 
included as well.  Thus, equation 2 with bilateral pair fixed effects (δij) and time dummies 
(λt) included becomes 
 ijttijijtjtitijt EYYX ελδββββ lnlnlnlnln 3210 ++++++=  (4.3) 
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Distance, language, and adjacency have all been dropped from equation (4.3) because 
they are time-invariant and therefore completely captured by the bilateral pair fixed effect 
term. 
 The inclusion of bilateral fixed effects in the analysis of the effect of the European 
Union (and its predecessors, the European Economic Community and European 
Community) yields striking results when compared to the typical gravity equation 
estimates that do not include bilateral pair fixed effects.  While most estimates of the 
effect of the European Union on trade flows found little evidence that membership in the 
EU by two countries increased bilateral trade flow between them (for example, see 
Frankel [1997] or Sapir [1981]), more recent studies that have included bilateral pair 
fixed effects have found dramatic increases in bilateral trade flows due to European 
Union membership of both trading partners (Baier, Bergstrand, Egger, and McLaughlin, 
2007). 
Avoiding endogeneity with survey data 
 To avoid endogeneity, I use survey data rating environmental regulation 
stringency.  In this survey, thousands of business executives are asked to rate countries’ 
environmental regulation stringency levels, relative to all other countries, on a scale of 
one to seven, where one indicates that a country has lax standards compared to others and 
seven indicates that a country has very strict standards compared to others.  I use the 
mean response of the executives’ ratings of each country each year as a proxy for 
environmental regulation stringency.  The model of an ordinal signal on a latent variable 
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presented in Appendix B shows that utilization of this survey variable might avoid the 
endogeneity issue that outcome variables introduce.   
Interaction of European Union membership and regulations 
 In addition to using a new proxy to test the effects of environmental regulation 
stringency on trade flows, I also test whether there is any interaction between 
membership in the European Union and environmental regulations affecting trade flows.  
Previous studies have sometimes controlled for economic integration agreements (EIAs) 
(see Harris, Konya, and Matyas (2002)), while others ignore EIAs altogether when 
analyzing environmental regulation stringency effects on trade flows; no gravity-type 
estimate has investigated whether EIAs interact with country-level environmental 
regulations.  The European Union (EU) has had specific environmental regulations that 
apply to all members in force since at least 1980 (for an example, see Council Directive 
80/779/EEC of July 15, 1980, on air quality limit values and guide values for sulfur 
dioxide and suspended particulates).  These EU-level regulations are interpreted and 
acted upon by country-level environmental regulation agencies; hence, an interaction 
effect should not be ignored.    
Data 
 I examine a panel of 56 countries from 2000 to 2005, listed in Table 1.  The 56 
countries included in the dataset were the only 56 countries for which survey data exists 
in all years.  Data on membership in the EU were taken from the EU’s website and are 
detailed in Table 2.  For the purposes of this paper, I have grouped all countries into 
either “High Income” or “Low Income.”  Countries grouped into “High Income” had real 
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per capita GDPs of $10,000 or more in the year 2000 according to IMF data30.  These 
groupings are shown in Table 3.   
 Nominal exports data come from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics CD-
ROM.  These were converted to real exports using country specific CPIs, base year 2000, 
taken from the IMF.  Observations of no recorded trade between two countries for a 
given year or recorded trade of zero were replaced with trade of $1 to avoid losing 
observations in the regressions when taking their natural logs.  Current GDP, 
denominated in US dollars, was converted to real GDP using those same CPIs.  GDP data 
also came from the IMF.     
 Ratings of environmental regulation stringency come from the World Economic 
Forum’s annual World Competitiveness Survey.  Only those countries that were rated in 
all years 2000 – 2005 in the survey were included in this dataset; hence, the dataset is a 
balanced panel.  Summary statistics of all variables as well as definitions are provided in 
Table 4. 
Results 
 The export flows are analyzed in six different patterns: all countries to all 
countries, high income countries to high income countries, high income countries to low 
income countries, low income countries to high income countries, low income countries 
to low income countries, and low income to all countries.  The econometric specification 
of equation 4.3 is 
                                                 
30
 The choice of $10,000 as the threshold is justified by examining a scatterplot and a kernel density plot of 
real per capita GDP.  If income is bimodal, Figure 1 shows the threshold between the two is at or near 
$10,000. 
 127
 
ijttijijtitjt
itijtjtitijt
EUENVREGSENVREGS
ENVREGSEURGDPRGDPrxp
ελδββ
βββββ
ln*
lnlnlnln
65
43210
+++++
++++=
 (6.1) 
where  
rxpijt= value of real exports from country i to country j in year t 
RGDPit= real GDP in country i in year t 
EUijt=dummy indicating whether countries i and j were EU members in year t 
ENVREGSit=environmental regulation stringency in country i in year t 
ENVREGSit*EUijt=interaction term 
δij=bilateral pair fixed effect term 
λt=time dummy for year t 
 The primary hypothesis tested is that exports from a low income country will be 
more negatively affected by an increase in environmental regulation stringency if that 
country is a member of the EU than if that country were not an EU member.  This 
hypothesis will be supported if coefficient on the ENVREG* EU interaction term is 
negative and significant in the low income to all countries regression.  A secondary 
hypothesis being tested is that a high income country experiences a greater increase in its 
exports due to an increase in environmental regulation stringency if it is in the EU; this is 
consistent with the idea that EU-wide regulations affect low income EU members’ 
competitiveness more, relative to high income EU members’ competitiveness. 
 ENVREGSit ranges from a possible minimum of 1 to a possible maximum of 7, 
where 7 indicates that country i has very stringent environmental regulations, compared 
to other countries, and 1 indicates that country i has very lax environmental regulations, 
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compared to other countries.  Thus, a positive coefficient on ENVREGSit would indicate 
that a unilateral increase in environmental regulation stringency in country i results in an 
overall increase in exports from that country its trading partners, ceteris paribus.  This 
could result from technology spillovers, consumer demand for “green” goods in trading 
partner countries, or signaling of regime stability and property right development.  It 
could also indicate that ENVREGSit proxies for some other factor that affects trade.  A 
negative coefficient on ENVREGSit would indicate that exports from country i decrease 
as a result of an increase in environmental regulation stringency in country i, indicating 
that the increased production costs made firms in country i less competitive.   
 The interaction term, ENVREGSit*EUijt, estimates the effect of an increase in 
environmental regulation stringency of the exporter, i, given that country i is in the EU.  
Its coefficient, β6, when added to the coefficient on ENVREGSit, β4, estimates the net 
effect on exports of an increase in environmental regulation stringency in European 
Union member countries.        
 Table 5 presents the results of gravity equation estimates of equation (6.1).  Each 
column corresponds to one of the groupings of bilateral pairs: column 1 shows estimates 
for all bilateral pairs (all-all), column 2 shows estimates for high income countries 
exporting to high income countries (high-high), column 3 shows high income to low 
income country pairs (high-low), column 4 shows low income to high income country 
pairs (low-high), column 5 shows low income to low income country pairs (low-low), 
and column 6 shows pairs of low income countries exporting to both high and low 
income countries (low-all).   
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 In Table 5, there are significant differences across groupings in the estimates of 
the effects of an increase in environmental regulation stringency.  Overall, it appears that 
an increase in environmental regulation stringency leads to an increase in exports, as the 
positive and significant estimates of exp_envregs in Table 5 indicate.  This might indicate 
that the effects on exports of technology spillovers, high income countries’ consumer 
taste for “green” goods, signaling of the establishment and protection of property rights, 
signaling of governmental stability, or developing comparative advantages in regulated 
industries more than offset the negative effect resulting from an increase in production 
costs due to more stringent regulations.  It is also possible that these positive coefficient 
estimates result from some omitted variable, such as an interaction effect with other, 
unspecified EIAs.  It is particularly odd that an increase in environmental regulation 
stringency leads to a statistically significant increase in exports from high income 
countries to high income countries (Column 2).  One explanation could be that increases 
in overall environmental regulation stringency sometimes are attached to subsidies or 
governmental aid to exporting industries, particularly those that would be most harmed 
by the change.   
 The coefficient estimates for the interaction term, exp_EU_envregs, should be 
added to the estimates on exp_envregs in Table 5 for estimates of the effect on exports of 
an increase in environmental regulation stringency for EU members.  The joint effects of 
the two estimates are tested for significance with Wald tests.  These joint effects and the 
results of the tests are reported in Table 6.   
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 The results reported in Table 6 elucidate that EU membership changes the effect 
of an increase in environmental regulation stringency.  The results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that increases in environmental regulation stringency have different 
consequences for low income, EU members’ competitiveness than for low income, non-
EU members.  The effect of an increase in environmental regulation stringency on 
exports from low income, EU members to every other grouping is negative and 
significant in Table 6.  Specifically, a one point increase in environmental regulation 
stringency rating causes exports from low income, EU members to all high income 
countries to decrease by 28.2%, exports from low income, EU members to all low 
income countries to decrease by 42.9%, and exports from low income, EU members to all 
countries to decrease by 36.8%.  Conversely, from Table 5, a one point increase in 
environmental regulation stringency ratings in a low income, non-EU member country 
causes exports to all the other groups (high income, low income, and all) to increase. 
 The results are also consistent with the hypothesis that high income, EU member 
countries are made relatively more competitive vis-à-vis low income countries due to an 
increase in environmental regulation stringency.  The joint effect of an increase in 
environmental regulation stringency on exports from high income countries to low 
income countries is positive and significant.  From Table 6, the effect of a one point 
increase in environmental regulation stringency on exports from high income countries in 
the EU to all high income countries is an increase of about 10.5%, and exports from high 
income countries in the EU to all low income countries increase by about 13%.  Exports 
from high income, non-EU countries to other high income countries also increase by 
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about 10% when environmental regulation stringency increases by one point, and exports 
from high income, non-EU countries to low income countries are not statistically 
affected.  High income countries in the EU seem to increase their competitiveness 
compared to low income countries by increasing regulatory stringency.   
 The joint effect estimates presented in Table 6 suggest that an EU-level regulation 
that increases environmental regulation stringency for all EU members could have an 
enormous impact on exports flowing from those countries.  In particular, low income, EU 
countries’ exports might decrease as a result while high income, EU countries actually 
might experience an increase in exports. 
 For robustness, Table 7 shows the same regressions with GDP coefficients 
restricted to unity, as a robustness check.  The similarity of the results lends credence to 
the results presented in Table 5.  Table 8 shows the same tests performed in Table 6, 
corresponding to the results shown in Table 7, where GDP coefficients are restricted to 
unity.  Again, the results when GDP coefficients are restricted to unity are nearly 
identical to when they are not restricted. 
Conclusion 
 Changes in environmental regulation stringency in a country theoretically and 
empirically have different effects on bilateral trade flows depending on whether the 
country is part of the European Union and on whether the country is a high income or 
low income country.  High income countries inside an economic integration agreement, 
such as the European Union, might have incentive to impose environmental regulations 
on the entire group of countries in the agreement.  Regardless of whether the profit 
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incentive actually exists or whether regulations are imposed on the entire EU, the 
consequences of an increase in environmental regulation stringency differ dramatically 
for high income countries in the EU compared to low income countries.   
 An increase in environmental regulation stringency in the exporting country 
generally increases exports from high income, EU member countries to all high income 
countries, although the difference between the estimate for high income, EU members 
and high income non-EU members is negligible.  Exports from high income, EU 
members to all low income countries increases significantly when environmental 
regulation stringency is increased in the exporting country, while exports from high 
income, non-EU members does not change significantly due to a similar change.   
 Conversely, an increase in environmental regulation stringency unequivocally 
decreases exports from low income countries in the EU.  A similar change in stringency 
has either no significant effect on low income, non-EU countries or possibly even a 
positive effect.  I conclude that a European Union decree of increased environmental 
regulation stringency for all countries could have a negative impact on exporting 
industries in low income, EU countries while the impact on high income countries is 
possibly positive. 
 Regional trade blocs have grown rapidly in the last two decades; furthermore, 
these trade blocs are no longer simple “free trade agreements” but now also include other 
economic integration objectives like harmonization of competition law policy and 
monetary policy.  This research shows that the interaction effects of regional trade blocs 
and regulations should not be ignored.  Additionally, this paper indicates a possible 
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political economy story behind the proliferation of the regionalization of regulations in 
general and of environmental regulations specifically.  The possible political economy of 
the regionalization of regulations offers many topics for future research, as does the 
investigation of its empirical effects on different groups in the region. 
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Table 4.1: Countries in dataset 
All Countries 
ARGENTINA JAPAN 
AUSTRALIA JORDAN 
AUSTRIA KOREA 
BELGIUM MALAYSIA 
BOLIVIA MAURITIUS 
BRAZIL MEXICO 
BULGARIA NETHERLANDS 
CANADA NEW ZEALAND 
CHILE NORWAY 
CHINA,P.R.: 
MAINLAND PERU 
CHINA,P.R.:HONG 
KONG PHILIPPINES 
COLOMBIA POLAND 
COSTA RICA PORTUGAL 
CZECH REPUBLIC RUSSIA 
DENMARK SINGAPORE 
ECUADOR SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
EL SALVADOR SOUTH AFRICA 
FINLAND SPAIN 
FRANCE SWEDEN 
GERMANY SWITZERLAND 
GREECE THAILAND 
HUNGARY TURKEY 
ICELAND UKRAINE 
INDIA UNITED KINGDOM 
INDONESIA UNITED STATES 
IRELAND VENEZUELA, REP. BOL. 
ISRAEL VIETNAM 
ITALY ZIMBABWE 
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Table 4.2: European Union countries 
 
European Union Countries 
AUSTRIA         
BELGIUM 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
DENMARK 
FINLAND 
FRANCE 
GERMANY 
GREECE 
HUNGARY 
IRELAND 
ITALY 
NETHERLANDS 
POLAND 
PORTUGAL 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
SPAIN 
SWEDEN 
UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Note: The other European Union members during this time period (Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, and Slovenia) are not included in the dataset because those countries’ environmental 
regulation stringencies were not rated in every year from 2000 to 2005. 
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Table 4.3: High income countries and low income countries 
 
High Income Low Income 
AUSTRALIA  ARGENTINA SLOVAK REPUBLIC 
AUSTRIA BOLIVIA SOUTH AFRICA 
BELGIUM BRAZIL THAILAND 
CANADA BULGARIA TURKEY 
CHINA,P.R.:HONG 
KONG CHILE UKRAINE 
CZECH REPUBLIC 
CHINA,P.R.: 
MAINLAND VENEZUELA, REP. BOL. 
DENMARK COLOMBIA VIETNAM 
FINLAND COSTA RICA ZIMBABWE 
FRANCE ECUADOR   
GERMANY EL SALVADOR   
ICELAND GREECE   
IRELAND HUNGARY   
ISRAEL INDIA   
ITALY INDONESIA   
JAPAN JORDAN   
NETHERLANDS KOREA   
NEW ZEALAND MALAYSIA   
NORWAY MAURITIUS   
SINGAPORE MEXICO   
SPAIN PERU   
SWEDEN PHILIPPINES   
SWITZERLAND POLAND   
UNITED KINGDOM PORTUGAL   
UNITED STATES RUSSIA   
 
Note: Countries in bold italics are EU members.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
lrxp log of real 
exports 18480 4.283165 3.695479 -9.21034 12.50515 
lrgdp_exporter log of real GDP 
of exporter 18480 5.025897 1.647459 1.417903 9.304228 
lrgdp_importer log of real GDP 
of importer 18480 5.025897 1.647459 1.417903 9.304228 
envregs_exp environmental 
regulation 
stringency 
rating, exporter 18480 4.534226 1.284484 2.3 6.8 
envregs_imp environmental 
regulation 
stringency 
rating, importer 18480 4.534226 1.284484 2.3 6.8 
EU dummy = 1 if 
both exporter 
and importer 
are in EU in 
year t, = 0 
otherwise 18480 0.072511 0.259339 0 1 
EU*envregs_exp interaction term 
= env. reg. 
stringency 
rating, exporter 
if exporter in 
EU in year t, = 
0 otherwise 18480 1.75119 2.601912 0 6.8 
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 Table 4.5: Gravity estimate with bilateral pair fixed-effects and time dummies 
 
 (1)All-All 
(2)High-
High 
(3)High-
Low 
(4)Low-
High 
(5)Low-
Low 
(6)Low-
All 
lrgdp_exporter 0.7783 0.6725 0.1783 0.8731 0.7750 0.8173 
 (41.97)** (6.92)** (1.37) (26.86)** (23.25)** (34.62)** 
lrgdp_importer 0.1926 0.7565 0.1808 1.0116 0.2370 0.2085 
 (10.39)** (7.79)** (9.49)** (4.57)** (7.12)** (6.90)** 
envregs_exp 0.1917 0.1042 -0.0718 0.0199 0.2283 0.1399 
 (6.13)** (2.07)* (1.06) (0.32) (3.62)** (3.13)** 
envregs_imp -0.0675 0.0886 -0.1439 -0.0092 -0.2322 -0.0809 
 (2.46)* (2.47)* (4.15)** (0.11) (3.82)** (1.81) 
EU -0.0689 0.0968 -0.0346 -0.0547 -0.1166 -0.0785 
 (0.92) (1.35) (0.40) (0.37) (0.46) (0.59) 
EU*envregs_exp -0.2110 -0.0042 0.1973 -0.3515 -0.7895 -0.5985 
 (3.48)** (0.07) (2.29)* (2.27)* (4.98)** (5.32)** 
Constant -0.8560 -2.4293 3.0859 -5.2309 -1.7458 -1.2989 
  (3.95)** (2.81)** (3.80)** (3.78)** (5.12)** (4.34)** 
Observations 18480 3312 4608 4608 5952 10560 
Bilateral Pairs 3080 552 768 768 992 1760 
R2 0.14 0.21 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.15 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses      
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
 
Note: Regressions of the natural log of real exports in years 2000 – 2005 from exporting country, i, to 
importing country, j, on the natural log of real GDPs of both countries, the level of each countries’ 
environmental stringency rating, an EU dummy (EU) equal to one if both the exporter and importer were in 
the EU in year t, and the exporter’s environmental stringency rating interacted with a dummy indicating 
whether the exporter was in the EU in year t (EU*envregs_exp).  Dummy variables for years 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, and 2005 are included in each regression (estimates not reported here; available upon request).  
Fixed-effects for each bilateral pair are included in each regression. 
 
Column 1 includes all country pairs in the dataset; column 2 includes only pairs where both exporter and 
importer are considered “high income;” column 3 includes only pairs where the exporter is “high income” 
and the importer is “low income;” column 4 includes only pairs where the exporter is “low income” and the 
importer is “high income;” column 5 includes only pairs where the exporter is “low income” and the 
importer is “low income;” and column 6 includes only pairs where the exporter is “low income” paired 
with all countries in the dataset. 
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Table 4.6: Gravity estimate with bilateral pair fixed-effects and time dummies, GDP 
coefficients restricted to unity 
 (1)All-All 
(2)High-
High 
(3)High-
Low 
(4)Low-
High 
(5)Low-
Low (6)Low-All 
envregs_exp 0.1788   0.1051    -0.0724     -0.0070    0.1791    0.1010    
 (5.38)** (2.08)* (-0.87) (-0.11) (2.71)** (2.18)* 
envregs_imp -.0925    0.0899     -0.3353    -0.0106    -0.4055    -0.1034    
 (-3.17)** (2.50)* (-7.98)** (-0.13) (-6.38)** (-2.23)* 
EU -0.3131    0.0410    -0.3952    -0.1012    -0.4615    -0.3142    
 (-3.93)** (0.58) (-3.79)** (-0.69) (-1.73) (-2.26)* 
EU*envregs_exp -.1992    -0.0013    0.2026    -0.3748    -0.8111    -0.6125    
 (-3.09)** (-0.02) (1.93) (-2.42)* (-4.85)** (-5.24)** 
Constant   -5.8467    -5.7081    -4.6436    -5.618    -5.4038    -5.8431    
  (-31.50)** (-19.22)** (-12.83)** (-11.07)** (-17.57)** (-22.96)** 
Observations 18480 3312 4608 4608 5952 10560 
Bilateral Pairs 3080 552 768 768 992 1760 
R2 0.0087 0.13 0.0252                         0.0104 0.0432 0.0168 
Note: Regressions of the natural log of real exports minus log of real GDP of exporter and importer 
(restricting their coefficients to unity) in years 2000 – 2005 from exporting country, i, to importing country, 
j, on the natural log of real GDPs of both countries, the level of each countries’ environmental stringency 
rating, an EU dummy (EU) equal to one if both the exporter and importer were in the EU in year t, and the 
exporter’s environmental stringency rating interacted with a dummy indicating whether the exporter was in 
the EU in year t (EU*envregs_exp).  Dummy variables for years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005 are 
included in each regression (estimates not reported here; available upon request).  Fixed-effects for each 
bilateral pair are included in each regression. 
 
Column 1 includes all country pairs in the dataset; column 2 includes only pairs where both exporter and 
importer are considered “high income;” column 3 includes only pairs where the exporter is “high income” 
and the importer is “low income;” column 4 includes only pairs where the exporter is “low income” and the 
importer is “high income;” column 5 includes only pairs where the exporter is “low income” and the 
importer is “low income;” and column 6 includes only pairs where the exporter is “low income” paired 
with all countries in the dataset. 
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Table 4.7: Net Effects of an Increase in Environmental Regulation Stringency for EU 
Members from Table 5 Estimates 
 
 All-All High-
High 
High-Low Low-High Low-Low Low-All 
Net effect -0.0193 0.1000* 0.1255* -0.3316* -0.5612** -0.4586** 
P-Value of 
Wald test 
of joint 
significance 
0.7173 0.0291 0.0413 0.0271 0.0003 0.0000 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
 
Note: The net effect for EU members arises from summing the coefficient on exp_envregs and the 
coefficient on exp_EU_regs shown in Table 5. 
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Table 4.8: Net Effects of an Increase in Environmental Regulation Stringency for EU 
Members from Table 5a Estimates 
 
 All-All High-
High 
High-Low Low-High Low-Low Low-All 
Net effect -0.0204 0.10038 0.1302 -0.3818* -0.6320** -0.5115** 
P-Value of 
Wald test 
of joint 
significance 
0.7187 0.0236 0.0828 0.0108 0.0001 0.0000 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%    
 
Note: The net effect for EU members arises from summing the coefficient on exp_envregs and the 
coefficient on exp_EU_regs shown in Table 5a. 
 
 145
Figure 4.1: Kernel Density of Real GDP per Capita with $10,000 cutoff line added 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation addresses issues in measurement and estimation techniques in 
the environmental economics and international trade.  The first chapter presents research 
in environmental economics the questions and tests the validity of the assumption of 
complete information about environmental disamenities in housing markets.  I find that 
the market appears well-informed about the location of groundwater contamination prior 
to the passage of multiple local regulation pertaining to groundwater in the vicinity.   
and international trade, and the third chapter synthesizes the two fields in addressing the 
effects of environmental regulations on international trade.  In all of the chapters, there is 
a consistent theme of improving metrics, proxies, and estimation techniques currently 
used in economic research.   
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Appendix A 
Countries in dataset of chapter three 
The following is a list of the 96 countries potentially used in the regressions, depending 
upon availability of non-zero and non-missing trade flows: 
Austria Belgium–Luxembourg Denmark 
Finland France Germany 
Greece Ireland Italy 
Netherlands Norway Portugal 
Spain Sweden Switzerland 
United Kingdom Canada Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic El Salvador Guatemala 
Haiti Honduras Jamaica 
Mexico Nicaragua Panama 
Trinidad and Tobago United States Argentina 
Bolivia Brazil Chile 
Colombia Ecuador Guyana 
Paraguay Peru Uruguay 
Venezuela Australia New Zealand 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland 
Romania Egypt India 
Japan Philippines Thailand 
Turkey Korea Algeria 
Angola Ghana Kenya 
Morocco Mozambique Nigeria 
Tunisia Uganda Zambia 
Zimbabwe China (Hong Kong) Indonesia 
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Iran Israel Pakistan 
Singapore Sri Lanka Syrian Arab Republic 
China,P.R.: Mainland Albania Bangladesh 
Burkina Faso Cameroon Cyprus 
Côte d'Ivoire Ethiopia Gabon 
Gambia, The Guinea–Bissau Madagascar 
Malawi Malaysia Mali 
Mauritania Mauritius Niger 
Saudi Arabia Senegal Sierra Leone 
Sudan Congo, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Republic of 
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Appendix B 
Endogeneity from environmental regulation stringency variables 
 Estimates of the effects of changes in environmental regulation stringency might 
also suffer from endogeneity in a gravity context when the measure of environmental 
regulation stringency is an outcome measure, such as energy use per capita, carbon 
dioxide emissions, or sulfur emissions.  Countries’ initial endowments of such sulfur- and 
carbon dioxide- emitting resources as coal and oil, as well as differences in the sulfur 
content of such resources, are not controlled for in typical gravity specifications but 
certainly would affect both choice of regulation levels as well as measured outcomes of a 
given level of regulation.   
 To formally demonstrate this, let Sit represent environmental regulation stringency 
in country i at time t.  Equation (4.3) implicitly includes this variable of interest in the 
error term.  Thus, the error term from equation (4.3), ln εijt, can be written 
ijtijtitjtitijt uESSS +++= 321ln γγγε       (A1) 
where Sit is environmental regulation stringency and Eijt still indicates whether both 
countries are in an economic integration agreement in year t.  The interaction term 
accounts for the possibility of EIA-level imposition of environmental regulations 
differing from unilateral changes in environmental regulations.  uijt is white noise; 
E(uijt)=0. 
 Most estimates of the effects of environmental regulations on bilateral trade flows 
rely on proxies for environmental regulation stringency; for example, Van Beers and Van 
den Bergh (1997) use societal indicators of environmental regulations’ effects, such as 
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recycling rates and market share of unleaded gasoline for part of their analysis; Harris et 
al. (2002), following another method used by Van Beers and Van den Bergh, use energy 
intensity measures, such as energy consumed per capita in a country in year t compared 
to that consumed per capita in a baseline year, 1980.  Usage of such an environmental 
policy outcome variable as proxy for environmental regulation stringency can easily 
introduce endogeneity into estimates of the effects of changes in that outcome variable on 
trade flows.  Let Q denote the proxy used for environmental regulation stringency: 
),( OSfQ =           (A2), 
where S is the actual stringency level and O represents other relevant factors that could 
affect the outcome variable such as country endowment of petroleum reserves or the 
sulfur content of coal and petroleum31.  I assume a simple functional form for Q: 
OSQ
ψψ
11
−=           (A3). 
Solving for S yields 
OQS +=ψ           (A4). 
Substituting equation (A4) into equation (A1),  
itijtijtitjtitijt OuEQQQ ++++= 332211ln ψγψγψγε      (A5) 
 Specification of the gravity equation shown in equation (4.3) to include Q, the 
proxy for environmental stringency, gives 
                                                 
31
 If energy intensity is used as the proxy, then endowment of energy-rich resources is important.  If sulfur 
emissions are used, then the differences in sulfur content of coal, petroleum, and other resources affects the 
outcome Q. 
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ijttijijtitjtitijt
jtitjtitijt
EQQQE
NNYYX
ελδββββ
βββββ
ln
lnlnlnlnlnln
111098
43210
+++++++
++++=
   (A6) 
where the error term in equation (A6) differs from that given in equation (4.3) because 
the first three terms of the RHS in equation (A5) are now explicitly in the RHS of 
equation A6.  The error term in equation (A6) is therefore 
itijtijt Ou +=εln          (A7) 
 Because Oit determines Qit, the correlation between Oit and Qit is non-zero, 
implying that 
0)|( ≠+ ititijt QOuE          (A8). 
 Thus, any outcome measure that depends on both environmental regulation 
stringency and country-specific endowment characteristics introduces bias into gravity 
equation estimates of the effect of environmental regulation stringency on trade flows. 
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Appendix C 
Modeling an ordinal signal on a latent variable 
 Let the data generating process be given by 
εµ lnlnln +−= kky          (B1) 
where y is the regulatory stringency level chosen by the country k, µ is the regulatory 
laxness signaled by the country, ε is noise in executive i’s observation of the signal, and 
ε~U[0,1].  Rewriting equation (B1) yields  
k
i
ky µ
ε
=           (B2). 
 Executives are asked to rate between 1 and 7 each country’s environmental 
regulation stringency relative to other countries; I assume some threshold, τi,  to exist 
between each two levels, as is illustrated below in Figure B1.  If the signaling process for 
country k yields a result in excess of a given threshold, the executive rates country k’s 
stringency at the next higher level. 
Figure B1: Thresholds in rating range 
 
Rating: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
        |        |           |            |           |           |       
       τ1         τ2         τ3         τ4          τ5             τ6 
Note that, despite the appearance of τi in Figure B1, the levels of τi are not restricted to 
any range.  Rather, these thresholds are simply the information that is signaled to 
executives.  For a simple example, assume the entirety of the signaling process is done by 
the amount of money spent on enforcement of environmental regulations.  Executives 
rate each country according to the millions of dollars spent on regulations in a given year, 
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while controlling for their expectations of corruption and governmental inefficiency in 
each country.  If the range of expenditure on regulation is from $1,000,000 to 
$71,000,000, then the thresholds could be any transformation of six points on the 
expenditure line that maintains their collinearity and the ratios of the distances between 
them. 
 Let xi,k denote the rating given by executive i to country k.  Given the six 
thresholds, the probability that country k will receive any given rating can be written as 
)ln(ln)1( 1τ<== kik yprobxprob        (B3.1) 
)ln(ln)ln(ln)2( 12 ττ <−<== kkik yprobyprobxprob     (B3.2) 
)ln(ln)ln(ln)3( 23 ττ <−<== kkik yprobyprobxprob     (B3.3) 
  .             . 
  .             . 
)ln(ln)ln(ln)6( 56 ττ <−<== kkik yprobyprobxprob     (B3.6) 
)ln(ln1)7( 6τ<−== kik yprobxprob       (B3.7)  
Using equation (B2), equations (B3.1 – B3.7) can be restated as 
)()()()ln(ln)1( 1111 τµτµετµ
ε
τ kkk
k
i
kik Fprobprobyprobxprob =<=<=<==  (B4.1) 
)()()ln(ln)ln(ln)2( 1212 τµτµττ kkkkik FFyprobyprobxprob −=<−<==  (B4.2) 
)()()ln(ln)ln(ln)3( 2323 τµτµττ kkkkik FFyprobyprobxprob −=<−<==  (B4.3) 
  .             . 
  .              . 
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)()()ln(ln)ln(ln)6( 5656 τµτµττ kkkkik FFyprobyprobxprob −=<−<==  (B4.6) 
)(1)ln(ln1)7( 16 τµτ kkik Fyprobxprob −=<−==      (B4.7) 
 Setting up GMM, the expected value of xi is  
 )7(7)2(2)1(1)( =++=+== ikikikik xprobxprobxprobxE L    (B5)  
 )](1[7)]()([2)()( 6121 τµτµτµτµ kkkkik FFFFxE −++−+= L    (B6) 
)()()(7)( 621 τµτµτµ kkkik FFFxE −−−−= L      (B7) 
Along with the assumption that ε~U[0,1], I scale τi such that∑
=
=
6
1
1
l
lτ .  The expected 
value of xi  is thus 
∑
=
−=−−−−=
6
1
621 77)(
l
lkkkkikxE τµτµτµτµ L      (B8) 
kikxE µ−= 7)(          (B9) 
Therefore, by GMM estimation of the parameter µ, equation (B9) is rewritten as 
x−= 7µˆ           (B10) 
where =µ v+µˆ  and ),0(~ •Nv .  Thus, our best guess of µ, the regulatory laxness 
signaled by a country, is an affine transformation of x , albeit measured with error, v.  
However, because 
)7( vx +−= ββµ            (B11) 
vx βββ ++= ~7          (B12), 
any bias from first and third terms in the RHS of equation B4.2 is lumped into the 
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intercept and error term, respectively, yielding β~ as an unbiased estimate on the sample 
mean. 
